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Outline of the Thesis
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that the the decision-maker (hence-
forth DM) is fully rational. This implies that she perceives all the given
alternatives before deciding, has infinite computational capabilities, and al-
ways chooses the best alternative (alternatives) from any choice set according
to an invariant preference relation. This assumption has being criticized as
unrealistic and many studies have been carried out both at a theoretical and
empirical level in order to provide alternative solutions (Conslik, 1996). One
of the most important criticism is directed by Herbert Simon (1955; 1956),
who proposes a list of simplifications in order to make the standard model
more realistic. For instance, he argues that in the real world individuals
do not perceive all the given alternatives before making the decision, but
typically discover and analyze alternatives sequentially. Moreover, a remark-
able amount of experimental evidence suggests that often subjects’ behavior
is not consistent with the full rationality hypothesis. Rather, experiments
confirm that subjects exhibit attitudes that are closer to what Simon calls
bounded rationality (Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993; Gigerenzer, Todd
and the ABC Research Group, 1999; Caplin, Dean and Martin, 2009). In
this thesis we analyze the impact of bounded rationality on various fields
of microeconomic theory by defining boundedly rational agents as individu-
als who follow the so-called satisficing heuristic proposed by Herbert Simon.
That is, individuals discover and analyze alternatives sequentially and stop
searching as soon as they identify the first alternative that they judge to be
satisfactory.
1
2 Outline of the Thesis
We first propose a theory of choice within the revealed preference ap-
proach in which the DM behaves consistently with the satisficing heuristic.
We investigate the conditions under which we can infer from choices whether
an alternative is considered to be satisfactory (revealed satisfaction), is re-
vealed to attract attention (revealed attention), and is revealed to be pre-
ferred to some other alternative (revealed preference). We examine these
identification issues under three different domains. Within each domain we
make assumptions about what what variables are observable and what are
not. For instance, if we assume that for each choice problem we can observe
both choice set, choice made by the DM, and search order, then we are able
to provide behavioral definitions of both satisfaction, attention, and prefer-
ence. On the contrary, assuming that we can partially observe search order,
then we are still able to infer satisfaction and preference, but attention only
partially. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of our procedure
under each domain. Finally, we analyze the relationships between our theory
and a related model (Rubinstein and Salant, 2006).
We also examine what are the effects of bounded rationality on indus-
trial organization. A notable amount of literature has been developed in this
field suggesting that boundedly rational individuals are typically subject to
exploitation (Spiegler, 2011). We investigate whether the fact that there is
uncertainty about consumers’ rationality increases their welfare. We ana-
lyze three market models: quality competition, signalling, and monopolistic
screening and show that it is not obvious a priori whether uncertainty helps
boundedly rationality. In particular, it depends on what market model we
assume. For instance, uncertainty increases boundedly rational consumers’
welfare in the quality competition model. On the contrary, uncertainty does
not help bounded rationality under the monopolistic screening model. More-
over, the analysis of our results allows us to derive some suggestions for
policy-makers.
Finally, we propose an experiment aimed at testing whether subjects’ be-
havior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic. We ask subjects to solve
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a sequence of choice problems under time pressure, where each problem is
represented by an incomplete algebraic sum. That is, at each problem only
the result and the operators are visible to subjects that are financially incen-
tivized to get as close as possible to the reported result by inserting numbers
from a given set into the empty spaces. We record not only final choices, but
also intermediate ones and decision time. We analyze the extent to which
subjects commit mistakes (that is, fail to insert the combination of numbers
that maximizes their material payoff) and choose sub-optimal alternatives
and how allocate decision time and make intermediate choices. We show
that on average subjects behavior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic.
We also find that complexity has a stronger impact on subjects’ performance
than the variable familiarity of the environment. In addition, we derive some
useful insights for modeling satisficing behavior. For instance, we find that
the threshold that defines an alternatives to be satisfactory is not fixed, but
vary across choice problems. Finally, we analyze the relationships between
our experiment and a related study (Caplin, Dean and Martin, 2009).
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the topics in-
vestigated in this thesis and provides a brief review of the related literature;
Chapter 2 proposes a theory of boundedly rational choice within the revealed
preference approach; Chapter 3 investigates the effects of bounded rational-
ity on industrial organization focusing on the effects of uncertainty; Chapter
4 proposes an experiment aimed at testing whether subjects’ behavior is con-
sistent with the Simon’s idea of bounded rationality; Chapter 5 concludes.
Proofs of proposition and theorems are given in the appendix.
4
Chapter 1
Bounded Rationality in
Economics: Theory,
Applications, and Experiments
1.1 Introduction
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that the DM is fully rational, knows
perfectly the choice set before making the decision, and has infinite computa-
tional capability. This implies that she always identifies and selects the best
alternative according to her preference relation. Many studies have been
carried out in order to highlight the limitations of standard theory (Conslik,
1996). They challenge the assumption that the economic man is a realistic
representation of economic agents and propose alternative solutions.
In this thesis we adopt the idea of satisficing proposed by Herbert Si-
mon (1955; 1956), according to which individuals have limited computa-
tional capabilities and typically do not search for the optimum, but look
for satisfactory alternatives. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the most
important studies in economics that assume DMs to be boundedly rational.
In particular we focus on choice theory, industrial organization, and exper-
5
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imental economics, topics within which we build our contribution. Section
1.2 summarizes Simon’s satisficing theory and provides a brief discussion of
the studies in psychology and marketing science on bounded rationality; sec-
tion 1.3 proposes a review of the literature on choice theory about bounded
rationality; section 1.4 discusses the most important studies in industrial
organization that assume consumers to be boundedly rational; section 1.5
proposes a review of the experimental literature on boundedly rational indi-
vidual decision-making; section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Bounded vs Full Rationality
The most systematic and consistent attack to the fully rationality assump-
tion is directed by Herbert Simon. He criticizes many aspects of standard
theory and points out that in reality individuals do not have computational
capabilities and access to information that the paradigm of rationality as-
sumes. He proposes a list of possible simplifications in order to make the
model more realistic. For instance, he suggests a simplified payoff func-
tion that has to be discrete rather than continuous. He illustrates a case in
which the simplified function is equal either to 0 or to 1, which means that
each outcome can be either ‘satisfactory’ (when the function is equal to 1)
or ‘unsatisfactory’ (otherwise). Then, Simon argues that clear comparisons
between alternatives are not always possible, namely payoffs are partially
ordered. As an example, he reports that in some cases it is not possible to
state which is the best option between two alternatives, because they may
not be comparable. A further issue he addressed is that solutions to the con-
sumer problem may not be unique or even exist. In particular, Simon argues
that the assumption about the choice set is unrealistic and that individuals
normally construct their choice set by discovering and exploring alternatives
sequentially. Searching through the choice set, they select the first ‘satis-
factory’ alternative, by which Simon means that people do not maximize a
utility function, but look for sufficiently good solutions, that are not nec-
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essarily optimal (Simon, 1955: 104).1 He also suggests that the aspiration
level that defines an alternative to be satisfactory can be updated during the
decision-making, depending on whether the searching process leads to new
satisfactory alternatives or unsatisfactory ones (Simon, 1955: 104-112). In
addition, he argues that the structure of the environment plays a central role
in permitting further simplifications of the standard model. For instance, if
the environment is relatively simple and familiar to the DM, then it is likely
that she will end up choosing an alternative relatively closer to the optimum.
On the contrary, if the environment is relatively complex and unfamiliar,
then most probably the DM will be content with an alternative relatively far
from the optimum (Simon, 1956).
The pioneer work by Simon gave rise to the concept of bounded rationality
and opened a new research field. A huge number of studies have been carried
out in both marketing, psychology, and economics.
If, on the one hand, the bounded rationality approach offers a list of ad-
vantages including a more realistic and adequate representation of economic
agents, then, on the other hand, the neo-classical framework has served as
useful tool for understanding and interpreting various relevant phenomena
that occur in the real world. Before moving to the next section we provide a
couple of examples in which standard theory does a good job in explaining
observed behaviors.
Plott and Uhl (1981) simulate a market in the laboratory. Sellers and
buyers were put into two separated rooms, could not communicate, and were
given marginal cost function and reservation price, respectively. At every
period four subjects, called middlemen (speculators), had first to enter sell-
ers’ room and buy inventories. After this first market, called A, was closed,
middlemen had to move to the buyers’ room and sell the products they pre-
viously bought from sellers. This market is called B. Both markets A and B
were organized as an oral double auction. After market B was closed, mid-
1If DMs are particularly lucky, then the satisfactory solution is also optimal. This
procedure has been called satisficing heuristic.
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dleman returned to market A and a new period started. Products could not
be carried forward to subsequent periods. If sellers and buyers were maximiz-
ing individuals and correctly estimated the probability of sales in market B,
then prices in the two markets should have been the same and attained the
level at which demand and supply intersect. Moreover, middlemen profits
should have been zero. Plott and Uhl (1981) show that what happened in
these markets is very well predicted by standard theory, including equilib-
rium price and the number of objects traded. It was as if middlemen did not
exist and sellers and buyers were in the same market.
There is extensive evidence that suggests that subjects are altruistic.
Consider the so-called dictator game according to which an individual, called
dictator, receives an amount x of money. She has to decide how much of this
amount to give to another player called receiver. Let g be this amount, with
g ∈ [0, x]. Standard theory predicts that g = 0, because it is not rational
to donate any amount of money. A notable amount of evidence has shown
that typically a substantive fraction of dictators (around 60%) donate the
20% of amount x. This finding is clearly in contrast with standard theory.
Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002) design a dictator game that involves
two stages. In the first stage dictators had to answer to some questions
taken from a graduate admission test. After the test they were given an
amount x of money that was linked with the performance in the test. That
is, the greater the number of correct answers, the greater amount x. Cherry,
Frykblom and Shogren (2002) show that the fact that dictators have to earn
money makes them very selfish. In addition, if the experiment is made fully
anonymous then altruistic behavior almost disappears.
1.2.1 Marketing Science
A consumer in a supermarket is typically confronted with hundreds of prod-
ucts (Schwartz, 2005). If she was fully rational, then she would consider all
of them and pick the best product according the her preferences.
A well-established result in the marketing science literature is that con-
Full vs Bounded Rationality 9
sumer’s behavior is not consistent with the full rationality assumption. Rather,
the consumer typically follows a two-step procedure, in which in the first
phase she restricts her attention on a subset of the available products, which
is called consideration set. Then, she picks the best product from the consid-
eration set according to her preferences. The way in which the consideration
set is constructed does not necessarily depend on consumer’s preferences.
There is strong evidence of this two-stage procedure (Wright and Bar-
bour, 1977; Alba, Hutchinson and Lynch, 1991; Roberts and Lattin, 1997;
Shum, 2004). Lussier and Olshavsky (1979), for instance, investigate how
task complexity affects brand choice strategy. They find that at more com-
plex problems subjects typically first eliminate alternatives that are judged
to be unacceptable by means of a noncompensatory decision strategy. A
strategy is noncompensatory whenever the DM does not make trade-offs be-
tween attributes. Then, among the remaining ones she chooses according to
a compensatory decision strategy, according to which compensation between
attributes takes place.
Hoyer (1984) studies laundry detergent purchases and finds that once
that consumers identify the relevant shelf in the supermarket, the median
number of products that they examine is one. In addition, unless promoted,
consumers typically do not consider superior brands displayed on the same
shelf, even though the products are new.
Finally, it is worth mentioning van Nierop et al. (2010), who propose a
probabilistic model aimed at inferring the consideration set from household
panel data.
1.2.2 Psychology
In psychology there are two main research programs aimed at studying
individual decision-making: the heuristics-and-biases program initiated by
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and the fast-and-frugal-heuristic pro-
gram proposed by Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter Todd, and the ABC Research
Group. These programs follow two distinct approaches.
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The goal of the heuristics-and-biases program heuristics is to provide
evidence that supports the hypothesis that individuals’ lack of rationality
leads them to behave in way that is not consistent with the laws of logic
and probability. In other words, the use of heuristics allows individuals to
save cognitive effort, but, on the other hand, implies that they do not behave
according to the normative theory. As an example consider the well-known
Monty Hall game (Chugh and Bazerman, 2007: 10-11).2 Monty asked a
participant to choose one of three doors. Behind one of these, there was the
grand prize and behind the other two there were small prizes. In the ‘Monty
always opens’ condition, Monty always opened an unchosen door and offered
to the participant the possibility to change her previous decision. In this case
the winning strategy, which is computed by using the Bayes’ rule, is always
to switch. In the ‘Mean Monty’ condition, Monty could decide either to end
the game, or to open an unchosen door and offer the possibility to switch
and his goal was to minimize the probability of winning. In this second case,
the optimal strategy is not to switch. Clearly, the condition under which
this game is played is crucial to calculate the optimal strategy. Nevertheless,
there is extensive evidence suggesting that in the large majority of the cases
participants decided not to switch.
On the other hand, the fast-and-frugal-heuristic program defines an heuris-
tic to be accurate depending on how well subjects’ behavior is predicted by
the heuristic. Therefore, according to this approach the extent to which
choices made according to an heuristic deviate from what the normative the-
ory prescribes is not a matter of interest. As an example, consider Rieskamp
and Hoffrage (1999), who examine experimentally adaptivity in individual
decision-making in multi-attribute framework by analyzing both process and
outcome data. They find that subjects are adaptive and willing to save cog-
nitive effort and that, under time pressure, fast and frugal heuristics, such as
2The game is based on the American television game called ‘Let us make a deal’, whose
first host was Monty Hall (from 1963 to 1977, and subsequently from 1980 to 1981 and
from 1984 to 1986).
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the lexicographic one, are much more accurate then the normative theory.
Analyzing the debate between these two schools is beyond the scope of
this thesis. As to what concerns us, it is worth underlying that both programs
agree on the assumption that DMs use simple heuristic to make decisions
and a huge literature has been developed on boundedly rational individual
decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; 1979; Payne, Bettman and
Johnson, 1993; Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group, 1999). In
addition, both approaches propose theories of choice in which they concept
of consideration set is employed.
Tversky (1972), one of the founders of the heuristic-and-biases program,
proposes a theory of choice called elimination by aspects. The idea is that
a good may or may not include an “aspect”.3 At each stage of the choice
process an aspect is selected with a certain probability, depending positively
upon its weight. Given a certain choice of an “aspect”, all alternatives that do
not have the selected aspect are eliminated. This procedure goes on until one
element remains (Tversky, 1972: 284-289). An interpretation of this process
is that a good is defined as a bundle of characteristics (or attributes), a cutoff
level is set for each characteristic, and attributes are ranked from the most to
the least important.4 Then, all elements that do not satisfy the cutoff level
of the most important attribute are eliminated. This procedure goes on with
the second most important attribute, with the third, and so on, until one
alternative remains. The idea is that, if a good does not satisfy the cutoff
3Tversky (1972: 285) provides the following example: assume that a decision-maker
wants to purchase a car. If the price of the car the decision-maker is considering is greater
or equal than $3000, then that car does not possess the aspect “it costs less than $3000”.
4This decision strategy is called characteristic-based search (CBS) because decision-
makers compare attributes across alternatives, such as cost, weight, color, and speed. The
idea is that decision-makers analyze the value of a single attribute of various alternatives
before examining the next attribute. The alternative-based search decision strategy (ABS),
instead, refers to a model in which decision-makers compare attributes within alternatives,
that is they analyze multiple attributes of a given alternative before examining the next
alternative (Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993: 29 and 31). The Elimination By Aspects
procedure is a CBS noncompensatory decision strategy.
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level of an attribute, then it does not posses an “aspect” (Payne, Bettman
and Johnson, 1993: 27).
On the other hand, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996a), introduce the so-
called take-the-best heuristic, which is a generalization of the well-known
lexicographic heuristic. Attributes are ranked according to their validity,
that is, according to how often each attribute has indicated that an option
is correct or not. The DM compares alternatives according to the most valid
attribute and eliminates all alternatives that are dominated on the selected
attribute. Then, she examines the second most valid attribute and again
eliminates all alternatives that are dominated on the selected attribute. This
procedure goes on until one alternative is left.
1.2.3 Economics
There is a huge literature in economics about bounded rationality. Stud-
ies have been carried out in various fields, such as decision-making under
uncertainty (Starmer, 2000), intertemporal choice (Frederick, Loewenstein
and O‘Donoghue, 2002), finance (Shleifer, 2000), other-regarding preferences
(Rabin, 1993).5
The next three sections provide a review of the literature about bounded
rationality in economics, focusing on choice theory, industrial organization,
and experimental economics, respectively. The remaining part of this section
proposes a brief history of the revealed preference theory, whose approach is
employed in the second chapter.
Brief History of Revealed Preference Theory
Economists have developed two distinct approaches for investigating individ-
ual decision-making: the preference-based and the choice-based (revealed-
preference). The former assumes that consumer preferences are primitive
and imposes requirements of rationality on them. Then, given consumer
5See also Rubinstein (1998).
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preferences, the consequences for choices are analyzed. In the choice-based
approach, choices are treated as primitive and assumptions about consumer
behavior are made.
There are several factors that make the second approach more appeal-
ing. First, the choice-based approach can incorporate a more general kind
of choice behavior. Second, unlike the preference-based approach, the re-
vealed preference one makes assumptions on observable objects (choices).
Therefore, a theory of individual decision-making based on the the choice-
based approach can have a behavioral foundation (Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green, 1995: 5).
The concept of revealed preference appears for the first time in Samuel-
son (1938). Paul Samuelson (1938) was critical about the preference-based
approach. He thought that making certain assumptions about consumer be-
havior, such as increasing rate of marginal substitution, is an ad hoc strategy
for explaining the kind of demand that is observed in markets. He was also
concerned about the concept of utility that, in his view, cannot be defined
as an entity independent of psychological elements. For this reason, he pro-
posed an alternative approach in which the primitive elements of the theory
are observable and independent of any introspective factor. This novel ap-
proach was not in contrast with the existing one. Rather Samuelson initiated
a research field aimed at providing a behavioral foundation of the theory of
consumer’s behavior.
The first definition of revealed preference is contained in Samuelson (1938)
and reads as follows (Varian, 2006: 2).6
Definition 1 (Revealed Preference) Given some vectors of prices and
chosen bundles (pt, xt) for t = 1, . . . , T , we say that xt is directly revealed
preferred to a bundle x (xtRDx) if p
txt ≥ ptx. We say that xt is re-
vealed preferred to x (xtRx) if there is some sequence r, s, t, . . . , u, v such
6The initial terminology was selected over. Richter (1966) pointed out that selected over
would have been better than revealed preference, because the former has the advantage
that it avoids a circular definition of preference. See also Varian (2006).
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that prxr ≥ psxs, psxs ≥ psxt, . . ., puxu ≥ pux. In this case, R is the
transitive closure of RD.
The intuition behind this definition is the following. Consider two vector
of prices and chosen bundles (pt, xt) and (p, x). The expenditures for (pt, xt)
and (p, x) are ptxt and px, respectively. Now, consider the vector (pt, x),
whose expenditure is ptx. If ptx ≤ ptxt, then this implies that bundle x was
available when xt was chosen. However, the consumer did not choose to do
so. Therefore, one can conclude that xt was selected over x. That is, xt was
revealed to be preferred to x (Samuelson, 1938: 64-65).
Samuelson then introduced a consistency property on individual behav-
ior that later became the well-known Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
(WARP).
Definition 2 (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) If xtRDx
s, then
it is not the case that xsRDx
t
The axiom says that if some bundle xt is chosen when another bundle xs
is available, then it cannot happen that xs is chosen over xt.
Ten years later Samuelson, motivated by the work of Little (1949), pro-
posed a method for reconstructing indifference curves from the revealed pref-
erence relation. However, the proof was mainly graphical and for only two
goods. Houthakker (1950), then, realized that in order to generalize Samuel-
son’s result to n goods an extension of the concept of revealed preference
from direct to indirect was necessary. He proposed the following condition.
Definition 3 (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference) If xtRxs, then
it is not the case that xsRxt.
Subsequently, Rose (1958) proved rigorously that Strong Axiom and Weak
Axiom are equivalent in the two-commodity case.
The theory of consumer behavior based on the revealed preference ap-
proach was almost brought to completion with Samuelson (1953), even though
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not completely rigorous. Later studies, such as Newman (1960) and Uzawa
(1960), added more formalism to the existing analysis. Finally, Marcel
Richter (1966) provided pure set-theoretic foundations to the problems of
integrability (recovering a utility function, given a demand function) and
representability (recovering the preference relation that induces a given de-
mand function). Formally, a budged space is a pair 〈X,P(X)〉, where X is
the grand set of alternatives (or set of bundles) and P(X) is a family of non-
empty subsets (or budgets) of X. A DM (or a consumer) is a function that
assigns to each A ∈ P(X) a non-empty subset c(A) ⊆ A. The interpretation
is that c(A) is the set alternatives chosen by the DM subject to the budget
A (Richter, 1966: 635).7
Besides Richter (1966) many other studies have been carried out both at
a theoretical and empirical level (Koo, 1963; Afriat, 1965; Sondermann, 1982;
Varian, 1982; Andreoni and Miller, 2002). As to what concerns us in this
study, it is worth mentioning the contributions by Kenneth Arrow (1959)
and Amartya Sen (1971). The former proved that WARP is a necessary
and sufficient property for the observed choice behavior to be rationalized
by a rational preference relation. The latter showed that WARP is logically
equivalent to two basic properties, called property α and β.8
1.3 Revealed Preference and Bounded Ratio-
nality
The key-concept in choice theory is the one of rationalizability. A choice
function is rationalizable whenever there exists a preference relation such
that the chosen alternatives from any given choice set are the best alterna-
7It is possible to impose c() to be a singleton, in which case indifference is ruled out.
8Property α: given an alternative x ∈ A ⊆ B, if x is chosen from the big set B,
then x has also to be chosen from the small set A. Property β: given two alternatives
x, y ∈ A ⊆ B, if x is chosen from the small set A and y is chosen from the big set B, then
x has to be chosen from the big set B (Sen, 1971: 313).
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tives in that set according to that relation. The assumption at the basis of
microeconomic theory is that individual preferences are rational. A prefer-
ence relation is rational whenever it is complete and transitive. Completeness
implies that, given two alternatives, the DM is always able to state whether
she prefers the first to the second one, the second to the first one, or whether
she is indifferent between the two. Transitivity, on the other hand, rules out
cyclical preferences. For instance, if Beatles are judged to be at least as good
as Rolling Stones and Rolling Stones at least as good as Doors, then, by
transitivity, it cannot be that Doors are strictly preferred to Beatles. As we
know from the previous section, Kenneth Arrow (1959) proved that WARP
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a choice function to be rational-
ized by a rational preference relation, provided that the budget set contains
all subsets of grand set up to three elements. Arrow’s result is very impor-
tant because it implies that any choice-theoretic model that departures from
WARP does not assume full rationality.
In what follows we discuss the most relevant boundedly rational models
in choice theory according to the kind of non-standard rationality that they
assume. Kalai, Spiegler and Rubinstein (2002) observe that often in real-life
situations WARP is violated. They argue that one possible explanation is
that the DM does not use a single preference relation, but several, each ap-
plied to a subset of the grand set. Their interpretation is that each choice set
encompasses information about its elements and by considering this informa-
tion, the DM chooses what she judges to be the best alternative according
to the appropriate rationale. Kalai, Spiegler and Rubinstein (2002) formal-
ize this idea and focus on choice functions that employ the minimal number
of rationales. Manzini and Mariotti (2007) propose a model in which the
DM still uses multiple rationales, but, unlike Kalai, Spiegler and Rubinstein
(2002), they assume that the DM applies them sequentially according to a
given order. The so-called Rational Shortlist Method is a choice function se-
quentially rationalized by two rationales. The idea is that the DM follows
a two-step procedure in which in the first phase she eliminates all alterna-
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tives that are dominated according to the first rationale. Then, among any
remaining ones, she selects the best alternative according to the second ra-
tionale. Notice that the set of alternatives that survives the first stage can
be interpreted as a consideration set, because it is from that restricted set
that the DM makes her final decision. One of the major strengths of the ra-
tional shortlist method is that it can explain irrational choice patterns, such
as cycles. Another study that employs the idea of sequential rationalizability
is Apesteguia and Ballester (2009a), who provide a characterization of the
class of models in which the DM sequentially applies a finite list of rationales.
In addition Apesteguia and Ballester relate their model to other well-known
boundedly rational procedures.
A notable amount of evidence suggests that subjects exhibit the so-called
status-quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). That is, subjects tend to
pay particular attention to a default option and evaluate it positively relative
to other alternatives. Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) axiomatically characterize
a model that incorporates standard choice theory as a special case in which
the DM is affected by the status-quo bias.9 According to this model the
DM evaluates alternatives by means of various criteria. If she faces a choice
problem without status-quo, then she selects the best alternatives according
to an aggregator of these criteria. On the contrary, if she confronts a choice
problem with status-quo, then she sticks with it, unless there are some al-
ternatives that dominate the status-quo in all dimensions, in which case she
chooses according to the aggregator of the above criteria. In the same spirit
Apesteguia and Ballester (2009b) characterize a class of models in which the
DM exhibits reference-dependent behavior.
Framing effects occur whenever the way in which the same problem is
presented to the DM affects choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1984). Salant and Rubinstein (2008) propose a framework
in which the choice function depends not only on the choice set, but also on
some observable information, called frame, which is irrelevant from a stan-
9See also Masatlioglu and Ok (2009) for an extension of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).
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dard viewpoint. They investigate the conditions under which their model
is equivalent to standard maximization and discuss the limitations of the
model of choice correspondence when the DM is affected by framing effects.
Bernheim and Rangel (2007) independently develop a similar model called
choice with ancillary conditions aimed at analyzing welfare implications of
bounded rationality.
Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti (2010), inspired by Tversky (1972) and
others, propose a choice procedure according to which the DM makes a deci-
sion by using a checklist. That is, she has in mind a list of ordered properties
and first eliminates all alternatives that do no possess the first property.
Then, among the remaining ones, she eliminates all alternatives that do not
possess the second property and so on until the survivor set does not shrinks
anymore. Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti interestingly show that this proce-
dure is equivalent to standard maximization. Manzini and Mariotti (2010b)
extend checklists by assuming that the order with which the DM goes through
properties can vary depending on the DM’s mood.10
Simon (1956) argues that the structure of the environment plays a central
role in determining the extent to which the standard framework can be sim-
plified. In particular, if the environment is particularly complex, then it is
likely that the DM will encounter relatively more difficulties in searching for
a best alternative. Tyson (2008) addresses this issue and proposes a model
in which the DM does not fully perceive her preferences by assuming that
this bias increases in the complexity of the choice problem. He shows that,
when complexity it is aligned with set inclusion (nestedness of preferences),
then his choice procedure is equivalent to Sen (1971)’s β property.11
The concept of consideration set has attracted a lot of attention among
choice theorists. Besides Manzini and Mariotti (2007), many other studies
10Another extension of Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti (2010) is provided by Manzini
and Mariotti (2010a), who develop a theory of choice called choice by lexicographic
semiorders.
11Property β: given two alternatives x, y ∈ A ⊆ B, if x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B), then
x ∈ C(B). See section 1.3.
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have been carried out in this field. Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) pro-
pose a model called choice by iterative search in which the DM starts by
analyzing an exogenously given contemplation point, considers only those al-
ternatives that are similar to it and, by means of an iterative search process,
stops searching as soon as the contemplation point is the best available al-
ternative in the consideration set. Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2009)
propose a model in which the DM still picks the best alternative among
those considered. However, unlike Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009), they
assume that the consideration set has the property that the removal of an
alternative that the DM does not consider does not change the consideration
set. Eliaz, Richter and Rubinstein (2011) axiomatically characterize three
different procedures by which a consideration set can be constructed.
Simon (1955) criticizes the assumption that the DM perceives all alter-
natives before deciding. He argues that it would be more realistic to assume
that the DM discovers and analyzes alternatives sequentially. In the second
chapter of this thesis we address this issue and propose a model in which the
DM behaves according to the satisficing heuristic. The closest studies to our
model are Rubinstein and Salant (2006) and Caplin and Dean (2011).
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) propose a model in which the DM faces lists
of alternatives and behaves according to the procedure 〈R, δ〉, where R is a
rational preference relation and δ is a priority indicator. Specifically, the DM
selects either the first or the last maximal element from any list according
to the preference relation R, depending on whether the priority indicator is
equal to 1 or 2, respectively.
On the other hand, Caplin and Dean (2011) model a reservation-based
search decision strategy by formalizing the concept of choice process data.
That is, the DM picks the best alternative among the ones she has already
explored at any given point in time and stops searching as soon as she identi-
fies the first alternative that yields at least the reservation utility, given that
searching is costly.
In the second chapter we discuss in detail the relationships between our
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model and Rubinstein and Salant (2006) and Caplin and Dean (2011).
1.4 Industrial Organization and Bounded Ra-
tionality
Plenty of studies have been carried out in order to model boundedly rational
DMs.12 More recently, a remarkable amount of literature has developed on
applications of theories of boundedly rational choice to various economic
fields. For instance, the analysis of welfare under the assumption that the
DM is boundedly rational has attracted a lot of attention (Bernheim and
Rangel, 2007; Apesteguia and Ballester, 2010; Rubinstein and Salant, 2010).
In the third chapter we apply bounded rationality to another important area
of economics: industrial organization (IO).
This research field is relatively new, as one of the pioneer studies was
conducted by Glenn Ellison and Drew Fundenberg in 1993. Ellison and
Fundenberg (1993) investigate the extent to which spread and dispersed in-
formation about product quality is aggregated at the population level and
affects firms’ decision about technology by assuming that boundedly rational
players have limited capacity of perceiving what technology yields the high-
est payoff.13 Despite its relatively young age, this research field has attracted
a lot of attention and many studies have been carried out. Ellison (2006)
proposes a nice survey in which he identifies three distinct traditions aimed
at analyzing the relationships between bounded rationality and IO. The first
one is called rule-of-thumb approach. This tradition, rather than character-
izing equilibrium behavior, assumes that economic agents behave in some
simple way. The second one is called explicit bounded rationality approach,
assumes that cognition is costly, and derives second-best behaviors, given the
costs. The third one models economic agents as individuals subject to biases
12See section 1.3.
13Ellison and Fundenberg (1995) propose a closely related model aimed at investigating
how the structure of information flows affects the learning process.
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typically detected in experimental economics and experimental psychology.
The goal of this section is to discuss the most important studies in this field
related to our work.
Standard contract theory typically assumes that individuals differ in pref-
erences or cost parameters. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), instead, assume that
individuals have dynamically inconsistent preferences and are heterogeneous
in the sense that they have different abilities in forecasting potential changes
in their future tastes. For instance, more sophisticated types are more capa-
ble of perceiving changes in their preferences. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) find
that more naive individuals are typically subject to an higher exploitation
and are associated with higher profits for the principal. Moreover, they use
their results to interpret real-life contractual agreements in a several indus-
tries.14 Non-standard preferences are also assumed in Spiegler (2010) that
investigates optimal pricing in a monopolistic setting, where individuals are
loss-averse according to a reformulation of the model by Koszegi and Rabin
(2006).
There are other studies in the IO literature that support the hypothe-
sis that boundedly rational consumers are subject to exploitation. Spiegler
(2006b), for instance, defines boundedly rational consumers as individuals
that follow an ‘anedoctal’ kind of reasoning. He shows that even market
interventions aimed at pushing out low-quality firms do not improve wel-
fare. Spiegler (2006a), instead, proposes a market model in which profit-
maximizing firms compete in a multidimensional pricing framework by defin-
ing boundedly rational consumers as individuals that have limited capacity
of understanding complex objects. In that model each firm to an increase in
competition responds by putting in practice a confounding strategy rather
than a strategy of more competitive prices. Finally, Rubinstein and Spiegler
(2008) investigate vulnerability to exploitation of boundedly rational invi-
diduals that have to decide whether or not to buy a lottery.
The idea of consideration set has attracted a lot of attention also in the
14See also Eliaz and Spiegler (2008).
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field of bounded rationality and IO. Eliaz and Spiegler (2009), for instance,
assumes that two firms compete in order to maximize market shares in a
context in which consumers suffer from the effects of marketing. In particular,
consumers apply their well-defined preferences only to the alternatives that
belong to the consideration set, which, in turn, can be manipulated by firms
by means of marketing strategies.15 Another study that employs the idea
of consideration set is Piccione and Spiegler (2010) that extend Bertrand
competition by modeling a two-firm market in which the consumer is affected
by framing effects. Firms have to decide not only the price of its product,
but also a pricing structure, which is called format. The consumer is assigned
randomly to one firm and the probability that she examines the other firm’s
product depends on the formats.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Ran Spiegler is writing a book titled
Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization (Spiegler, 2011) in which
he summarizes his main results in this field.16
1.5 Experiments on Individual Decision-making
and Bounded Rationality
There is a huge experimental literature about boundedly rational individ-
ual decision-making both in economics and psychology. The large majority
of these studies have in common a methodological feature: most of them
make use of data enrichment techniques. That is, not only final choices are
recorded, but also other variables of interests, such as decision time and in-
termediate choices, are taken into account. The idea is that those additional
data can shed light on the process that leads the DM to make her decision.
Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993) use verbal protocols and mouseLab
to test adaptivity in individual decision-making. Verbal protocols require
subjects to write down what they are thinking during the decision process.
15See also Eliaz and Spiegler (2010) for an extension of Eliaz and Spiegler (2009).
16This book should be available starting from January 2011.
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MouseLab, instead, implies that subjects are presented on their screen with
black boxes, behind which information is hidden. To access, subjects have
to click on the box that they want to open. MouseLab allows experimenters
to know how many times and how long subjects have looked at each piece
of information. A similar analysis is performed by Rieskamp and Hoffrage
(1999; 2008), who use mouseLab to test adaptivity under low and high time
pressure. Those studies find that subjects change decision strategies as task
complexity increases; that is, decision-makers are adaptive and willing to
conserve cognitive effort.
MouseLab is also employed by Gabaix et al. (2006), who analyze aggre-
gate information acquisition patterns in multi-attribute and multi-alternative
choice problems (maximize an algebraic sum). What they find is that the
directed cognition model (Gabaix and Laibson, 2005) seems to fit the ex-
perimental data. In the directed-cognition model DMs do not explore all
possible alternatives, but only those that have the highest ratio of benefit
to cost. Furthermore, when their model and the fully rational one differ,
the directed-cognition model better predicts subjects’ information acquisi-
tion patterns.
Reutskaja et al. (2010), instead, use eye-tracking to investigate consumer
search dynamics in a context characterized by time pressure. Eye-tracking
records eye movement images and pupil dilatation by means of a camera
placed on the computer screen. Eye movement images allow experimenter to
infer subject information acquisition patterns, whereas pupil dilatation yields
information about arousal, pain, and cognitive difficulty. In that experiment
subjects have to choose among snack food items. Reutskaja et al. (2010)
show that first subjects tend to choose the optimal alternative among the
discovered ones. Second, search behavior is compatible with an hybrid of
the optimal search and the satisficing model. Third, subjects seem to search
more often in certain areas of the monitor.
Another study that uses eye-tracking is Arieli, Ben-Ami and Rubinstein
(2010) that tests whether subjects use an ABS or CBS decision strategy while
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choosing binary lotteries.17 Arieli, Ben-Ami and Rubinstein (2010) find that
whenever the computation of the expected value is difficult, subjects tend
to use a CBS decisions strategy. Differently, when computations are easier,
subjects behavior is consistent with an hybrid of a CBS and ABS decision
strategy.
In the fourth chapter we propose an experiment aimed at testing whether
subjects behavior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic. The closest
study to our experiment is Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009).
Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009) propose an experiment in which they
analyze the source of choice errors by using a data enrichment technique
called choice process data. Subjects have to choose the highest sum of money
expressed in terms of a sum of natural numbers. According to choice process
data, not only final choices but also intermediate ones that change with the
contemplation time are recorded. Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009) show
that subjects behavior is consistent with the satisficing procedure proposed
by Herbert Simon (1955).
The relationships between our experiment and Caplin, Dean and Martin
(2009) are discussed in detail in chapter 4.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides a review of the literature in economics about bounded
rationality focusing on choice theory, industrial organization, and experimen-
tal economics.
Equipped with the tools provided in this chapter, one should be able to
better understand not only the content of the coming chapters, but also what
is our contribution relative to the existing literature.
17ABS and CBS stand for alternative-based and characteristic-based, respectively. See
section 1.2.2 for definitions.
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Chapter 2
Satisficing Choice Procedures
2.1 Introduction
The problem of choice is the basis of microeconomic theory. Standard models
of decision theory assume that a choice problem is composed of two elements:
a family P(X) of nonempty subsets of the grand set of alternatives X and
a choice function c : P(X) → X. The problem of choice entails picking one
element from a choice set A ∈ P(X) that is known in advance (Richter, 1966;
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995).
This framework has been criticized as unrealistic. According to Herbert
Simon,
in most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are eval-
uated before a choice is made. In actual human decision-making,
alternatives are often examined sequentially. We may, or may
not, know the mechanism that determines the order of procedure.
When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the
first satisfactory alternative that is evaluated as such as the one
actually selected. (Simon, 1955: 110)
Plausibly, in the real world the DM does not evaluate all alternatives
before making the decision. Rather, she discovers and explores new alterna-
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tives while the choice-process is taking place. We propose a model within
the revealed preference approach in which we assume that the DM discovers
and analyzes alternatives sequentially. There are various circumstances in
the real world in which alternatives are presented to the DM in form of a
sequence. For instance, alternatives may be disposed horizontally on some
shelf and the DM examines them from left to right. In this case there is
a spatial constraint that prevents the DM from perceiving all alternatives
before deciding. Alternatively, the DM may receive job offers sequentially in
time. There are also circumstances in which constraints are neither spatial
nor temporal, but the DM examines alternatives sequentially, because alter-
natives come to the DM’s mind according to some ordering. As an example
think of a person who has to decide where to spend her summer vacation.
Typically, an individual does not have in mind a complete set of potential
destinations. Rather, she discovers and analyzes new options by searching on
the web and referring to travel agencies while the decision process is taking
place.1
We assume that the DM behaves according to the well-known satisficing
heuristic (Simon, 1955). That is, she explores alternatives sequentially, stops
searching as soon as she identifies the first satisfactory alternative, and se-
lects the best alternative among those discovered. If there is no satisfactory
alternative in the choice set, then the DM reconsiders all alternatives and
picks the best available one. Of course there are other ways in which one
could model satisficing behavior. For instance, suppose that the DM is par-
ticularly lucky and identifies the first satisfactory alternatives in relatively
little time. Then one could assume that since she has exerted little cogni-
tive effort to identify the first acceptable alternative, then she can manage
to keep searching in order to find better alternatives. This would mean to
design a model in which the DM does not necessarily stop as soon as the
first acceptable alternative is discovered, but the extent to which she keeps
searching depends on the length of the search history.
1See Rubinstein and Salant (2006) for further discussion and examples.
Introduction 29
We investigate the conditions under which we can infer from choices
whether or not an alternative is revealed to be satisfactory (revealed sat-
isfaction), to attract attention (revealed attention), and to be preferred to
some other alternative (revealed preference). We explore these issues under
three different domains. We first assume that, for each choice problem, we
can observe not only the choice set and the choice made by the DM, but also
the entire menu sequence according to which she examines alternatives. In
this case we are able to provide behavioral definitions of both attention, satis-
faction, and preference. In addition we show that our procedure is equivalent
to an axiom called Full Attention WARP, which is a weakening of standard
WARP. In particular Full Attention WARP requires the DM to choose con-
sistently with standard WARP restricted to those alternatives to which she
pays attention. Our model includes the standard maxization procedure as a
special case, because if the DM pays attention to all alternatives at all choice
problems, then Full Attention WARP reduces to WARP.
Under the second domain, we assume that we cannot observe the entire
menu sequence, but only its first stage. In this case we provide behavioral
definitions of satisfaction and preference and we show that attention can be
inferred only partially. We also axiomatically characterize our procedure by
using a slightly modified version of Full Attention WARP.
Finally, we assume that the order according to which the DM examines
alternatives is unobservable. Under this domain we show that we can infer
satisfaction and also preference, but only over unsatisfactory alternatives. In
addition we demonstrate that our model is a special case of the standard
maximization procedure.
The model is related to the literature about attention and consideration
set (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2009; Masatlioglu, Naka-
jima and Ozbay, 2009).2 The closest studies to our work are Rubinstein and
Salant (2006) and Caplin and Dean (2011). Rubinstein and Salant (2006) de-
velop a model called choice function from lists in which they assume that the
2See sections 1.3 and 1.4 for more details.
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DM chooses from sequences of alternatives. Unlike the proposed model, they
assume that the DM necessarily examines alternatives one by one. The rela-
tionships between our model and Rubinstein and Salant (2006) are analyzed
in detail in a section below.
Caplin and Dean (2011) propose a reservation-based search decision strat-
egy by formalizing the concept of choice process data. That is, the DM picks
the best alternative among the ones she has already explored at any given
point in time and stops searching as soon as she identifies the first alterna-
tive that yields at least the reservation utility, given that searching is costly.
Unlike their model, we do not make use of choice process data, but consider
only final choices and assume that search order is observable or partially ob-
servable. We also investigate the case in which search order is unobservable
as Caplin and Dean (2011) do, but the two models still differ because un-
like them we assume that in this case the choice correspondence records the
choices made by the DM under multiple menu sequences.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 develops the formal
model; Section 2.3 provides an axiomatic characterization of the model and
behavioral definitions of revealed satisfaction, attention, and preference un-
der three different domains; Section 2.4 investigates the relationship between
the our model and and Rubinstein and Salant (2006). Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Let X be a finite grand set of alternatives, where P(X) represents the set of
all non-empty subsets of X. As we know from chapter 1, in standard choice
theory a choice problem is simply a choice set A ∈ P(X). In this framework
we define an extended choice problem as a pair (A, {Aj}), where A ∈ P(X)
is a choice set and {Aj} represents a sequence with which the DM examines
the alternatives in A. We call {Aj} menu sequence and define it as follows.
Definition 4 A menu sequence of the set A ∈ P(X) is a sequence {Aj}N1
such that Aj ⊆ Ak ⊆ A, for all k > j and AN = A.
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We call each element Aj of the menu sequence {Aj} stage of the menu
sequence {Aj}.
Let an extended choice function be a choice function defined on the do-
main D1 = {(A, {Aj})|A ∈ P(X) and {Aj} is a menu sequence of A}. We
assume that c(A, {Aj}) is non-empty and picks one alternative from A.
Let  be a strict linear order on the set X representing DM’s preferences.3
Let xs ∈ X be a distinguished alternative (or an aspiration level) such that
all alternatives to which xs is -preferred are considered to be unsatisfactory.
Let UC(A;xs) = {x ∈ A|¬(xs  x)} be the upper-contour set of xs accord-
ing to , representing the set of satisfactory alternatives available in the set
A.4 Let max(A;) = {x ∈ A|@y ∈ A s.t. y  x} be the set of maximal
alternatives according to the relation  in the set A. Since  is assumed to
be a linear order, then the set max(A;) is always a singleton.
Definition 5 c is a Satisficing Choice Function (SCF) if and only if there
exist a strict linear order  on X, an alternative xs ∈ X, and a consideration
set mapping Γ(A,{Aj}) ⊆ A such that
{c(A, {Aj})} = max(Γ(A,{Aj});)
where
Γ(A,{Aj}) =
{
Aj if UC(A;x
s) 6= ∅
A otherwise
and j = min{j|Aj ∩ UC(A;xs) 6= ∅}.
3A binary relation  is irreflexive whenever (x, x) /∈. Given x, y, z ∈ X, a binary
relation  is transitive, whenever (x, y) ∈ and (y, z) ∈ imply that (x, z) ∈. Given
x, y ∈ X such that x 6= y, a binary relation  is complete whenever either x  y or
y  x. Given x, y ∈ X, a binary relation  is asymmetric whenever (x, y) ∈ implies
that (y, x) /∈. A strict linear order is a transitive, asymmetric, irreflexive, and complete
binary relation.
4Since xs ∈ X, then we assume that x ∈ UC(A;xs) whenever x ∈ A and ¬(xs  x)
because we want also the aspiration level xs to be part of the upper-contour set at all
A ∈ P(X) such that xs ∈ A.
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Our interpretation is that the DM has in mind a preference relation 
and a distinguished alternative xs. She judges satisfactory those alternatives
that are at least as good as xs and unsatisfactory those that are worse than
xs. The DM searches through the choice set A according the menu sequence
{Aj} and if she identifies at least one satisfactory alternative in the first stage,
then she stops searching at A1, which becomes the consideration set, and
selects the-maximal alternative available inA1. Otherwise, she explores the
second stage. Then, again if she identifies at least one satisfactory alternative
in the second stage, then she stops searching at A2, which becomes the
consideration set, and selects the -maximal alternative available in A2.
Otherwise, she keeps searching and the procedure is the same as before. If
there is no satisfactory alternative in the choice set A (i.e., UC(A;xs) = ∅),
then she selects the -maximal unsatisfactory element from A. In this case
the consideration set coincides with the choice set A.
2.2.1 Explained Behaviors
The proposed procedure can be defined also in terms of choices with frames
(Salant and Rubinstein, 2008).5 Let a frame be weak order O on X, repre-
senting an ordering with which the DM examines alternatives. We identify
the choice function with frames cO(A) with the extended choice function
c(O|A), where O|A is the menu sequence induced by restricting the order O
to the choice set A ∈ P(X). An SCF, which we denote by cSCF (O|A), can
then be defined as:
cSCF (O|A) = max(A;O)
where O≡ ( \{(x, y) ∈ |x, y ∈ UC(X;xs)}) ∪ {(x, y) ∈ |x, y ∈
UC(X;xs) s.t. xOy and (¬(yOx) or x  y)}
Clearly, any cSCF (O|A) satisfies WARP. Therefore, violations of WARP
can take place only when the DM mixes two or more frames. Since the
5See section 1.3.
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proposed model does not place any restriction on menu sequences, then this
implies that an SCF can explain a variety of irrational choice patterns. The
next examples illustrate that the proposed procedure can explain cyclical
choice patterns and menu effects.
Example 1 (Cycles) Let x, y, x ∈ UC(X;xs) and assume z  x  y. Let
(A, {Aj}), (B, {Bj}), and (C, {Cj}) such that A1 = {x}, y ∈ A, B1 = {y},
z ∈ B, C1 = {z}, and x ∈ C. Since the DM stops searching as soon as
she identifies the first satisfactory alternative, then x = c(A, {Aj}), y =
c(B, {Bj}), and z = c(C, {Cj}). This choice pattern clearly exhibits a cycle.
Example 2 (Menu Effects) Assume that x, y ∈ UC(X;xs) and x  y.
Let (A, {Aj}), (B, {Bj}), and (C, {Cj}) such that A1 = A = {x, y}, B1 =
B = {x, z}, C1 = {y, z}, and C = {x, y, z}. If c is an SCF, then x =
c(A, {Aj}), x = c(B, {Bj}), and y = c(C, {Cj}). This choice pattern exhibits
menu effects, because x is chosen in binary comparison over y and over z.
However, when the choice set encompasses both x, y, and z, the DM chooses
y.
Despite this feature, the satisficing procedure cannot explain any choice
pattern, as the next example illustrates.
Example 3 (Violations of Satisficing) Assume that x ∈ UC(X;xs). Let
(A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 be such that A1 = {x}. Since x is satisfactory, then the DM
must stop searching at A1 and chooses x. Therefore, any c that does not
select x from (A, {Aj}) is not an SCF.
2.3 Axiomatic Characterization
Suppose that we observe the DM making choices. Our concern is to find be-
havioral definitions of satisfaction (xs), attention (Γ(A,{Aj})), and preference
(). Moreover, we are interested in identifying the conditions under which
her behavior is consistent with the satisficing procedure. We explore these
identification issues under three different domains.
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2.3.1 Full Domain
Under the full domain D1, we assume that, for every choice problem, we can
observe not only the choice set and the choice made by the DM, but also the
entire menu sequence.
Assume that c is an SCF. How can we tell whether an alternative is
satisfactory of not? A satisficing DM always stops searching as soon as
she identifies a satisfactory alternative. Therefore, it must be that if an
alternative x is satisfactory, then the DM never discovers x and then explores
further the menu sequence. In other words, if x is acceptable, then it cannot
happen that the DM discovers and chooses some alternative y at some stage
of the menu sequence, given that at an earlier stage she explored x.
Formally, define A
c(A,{Aj})
m as the first stage of the menu sequence {Aj}
to which the chosen alternative c(A, {Aj}) belongs, where m = min{j :
c(A, {Aj}) ∈ Aj}. If x is acceptable, then it cannot happen that x ∈
A
c(A,{Aj})
m−1 . The next proposition states that this condition is not only neces-
sary, but also sufficient for x to be satisfactory.
Proposition 1 (Revealed Satisfaction) Suppose that c is an SCF. Then,
x ∈ UC(X;xs) if and only if there exists no (B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that
x ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 . Whenever this occurs we say that x is revealed to be
satisfactory.
Next, we analyze the conditions under which we can unambiguously state
what alternatives are considered by the DM. Assume the DM chooses some
alternative y from (A, {Aj}) and we are instersted in verifying whether she
considers x. If x = y, then obviously she considers x. Next, assume that
x 6= y and that x ∈ Ac(A,{Aj})m . Then, once again we can conclude that the
DM considers x. The reason is that since y is chosen, then it must be that
all alternatives that precede y in the sequence (or are discovered at the same
time as y) are considered. Finally, assume that x /∈ Ac(A,{Aj})m . This implies
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that the chosen alternative y precedes x in the menu sequence. The only
way in which the DM can explore x is that the chosen alternative y is not a
satisfactory alternative. We already know, by proposition 1, that this occurs
whenever there exists a choice problem (B, {Bj}) such that y ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 .
Whenever one of these three cases occur we say that x attracts attention at
(A, {Aj}). The next proposition states this concept formally and provides a
behavioral definition of revealed attention.
Proposition 2 (Revealed Attention) Suppose that c is an SCF. Then,
x ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}) if and only if either
1. y = c(A, {Aj}) and x ∈ Ac(A,{Aj})m or
2. y = c(A, {Aj}) and there exists a (B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that y ∈
B
c(B,{Bj})
m−1 .
Whenever this occurs we say that x attracts attention at (A, {Aj}).
We are also interested in investigating whether, given two alternatives
x, y ∈ X, x is revealed to be preferred to y or vice versa. Assume that
x = c(A, {Aj}) and that y ∈ A. This information is not enough for ensuring
that x  y. To see why, assume that y is preferred to x, x = c(A, {Aj}), and
y ∈ A. This does not lead to a contradiction, because it might have happened
that the DM stopped searching before exploring y and chose x. Therefore, in
order to conclude that x  y we must also require that y attracts attention
at (A, {Aj}). The next proposition states this result formally.
Proposition 3 (Revealed Preference) Suppose that c is an SCF. Then,
x  y if and only if there is some (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 such that x = c(A, {Aj})
and y attracts attention at (A, {Aj}). Whenever this occurs we say that x is
revealed to be preferred to y.
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Now we move to the axiomatic characterization.
Standard WARP requires that given two alternatives x, y ∈ A ∩ B, if
x = c(A), then y 6= c(B) without distinguishing between alternatives that
the DM considers and alternatives that she does not. We introduce a weaker
version of this property, which we call Full Attention WARP. This property
requires the extended choice function to satisfy WARP, provided that the
DM pays attention to x and y at both choice problems according to the
definition provided in proposition 2.6
Full Attention WARP (FAWARP). Assume that x and y attract at-
tention at (A, {Aj}) and (B, {Bj}). Then, if x = c(A, {Aj}), then y 6=
c(B, {Bj}).
The main result of this section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 An extended choice function c is an SCF if and only if c satisfies
Full Attention WARP.
Equipped with the results of this subsection, we are able to infer non-
parametrically whether DM’s behavior is consistent with the satisficing pro-
cedure simply by testing the axiom that characterizes the SCF. In addition,
by using propositions 1, 2 , and 3 we can infer both revealed satisfaction,
attention, and preference.
Finally, notice that if x attracts attention at (A, {Aj}) for any x ∈ A for
all (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1, then FAWARP reduces to WARP and c is rationalizable
by a strict linear order. It is easy to see that this happens if and only if {xs} =
max(X;). That is, a necessary and sufficient condition for the extended
6Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2009) introduce an axiom called ‘WARP with
Limited Attention’. The difference between FAWARP and WARP(LA) is in the definition
of ‘paying attention to’. Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2009) define a set to be a
consideration set whenever the removal of one alternative that the DM does not consider
does not change the consideration set. On the contrary, in this paper the consideration
set is defined according to the definition of proposition 2.
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choice function to be equivalent to standard maximization is that the minimal
satisfactory alternative is maximal in the grand set. This observation is
intuitive: given that the DM is satisfied only when she chooses a satisfactory
alternative, if there is only one satisfactory alternative in the grand set, then
it is as if the DM got satisfied only at the optimum.
2.3.2 Partially Observable Menu Sequences
There are circumstances in which assuming that we can always observe the
entire menu sequence for any choice problem is too demanding. For instance,
consider a consumer who analyzes the items allocated on a certain shelf. It
is hard to assume that the order with which she examine alternatives is
exogenously given. She may explore items from left to right or form to top
to the bottom. She may even mix multiple search heuristics, in which case
the above assumption would hardly hold. On the contrary, it seems more
realistic to assume that we can identify the set of items at which she starts her
search process. In the above example the observable starting point could be
the set of items placed at the head of the shelf that the consumer necessarily
considers.
In order to capture this kind of situations we introduce the domain D2 =
{(A,A1)|A1 ⊂ A ∈ P(X)}. We interpret (A,A1) as a choice problem, where
A is the choice set and A1 is the first (observable) stage of the menu sequence.
The remaining stages (if any) are assumed to be unobservable. The next
definition formalizes the satisficing procedure on the domain D2.
Definition 6 c is a Satisficing Choice Function under D2 (SCF2) if and only
if there exist a strict linear order , an alternative xs, and a consideration
set mapping Γ(A,A1) ⊆ A such that
{c(A,A1)} = max(Γ(A,A1);)
where
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Γ(A,A1) =

A1 if UC(A1;xs) 6= ∅
A¯ if UC(A \ A1;xs) 6= ∅ = UC(A1;xs)
A otherwise
and A1 ⊂ A¯ ⊆ A.
Our interpretation of the SCF2 is analogous to the SCF’s. The only
difference is that if the DM does not find any satisfactory alternative in the
first stage of the menu sequence, then she keeps exploring the next stages
until she identifies a satisfactory alternative, in which case she stops searching
and selects the -maximal alternative. Since all stages of the menu sequence
apart from the first one are unobservable, then in this case the consideration
set is given by A¯, where A¯ is some subset of A such that A1 ⊂ A¯ ⊆ A.
Now we move to the behavioral definitions of satisfaction, attention, and
preference. The definitions of revealed satisfaction and preference are analo-
gous to the ones of previous section.
Proposition 4 (Revealed Satisfaction) Suppose that c is an SCF2. Then,
x ∈ UC(X;xs) if and only if there exists no (A,A1) ∈ D2 such that x ∈ A1
and c(A,A1) /∈ A1. Whenever this occurs we say that x is revealed to be
satisfactory.
Proposition 5 (Revealed Preference) Suppose that c is an SCF2. Then,
x  y if and only if there is some (A,A1) ∈ D2 such that x = c(A,A1) and
y ∈ A1. Whenever this occurs we say that x is revealed to be preferred
to y.
It is worth observing that in order to infer , we have to required |A1| > 1
for some suitable (A,A1) ∈ D2. To see why, suppose not and assume that
all alternatives in the grand set are satisfactory. In this case the DM always
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stops searching at the first stage and selects its alternative. This implies that
it is impossible to infer whether x  y for all x, y ∈ X. On the contrary,
revealed satisfaction can be inferred even without this assumption.
Providing a behavioral definition of revealed attention is more compli-
cated, because some stages of the menu sequence are not observable. In
particular we can infer that x is part of the DM’s consideration set only
if two cases occur. First, either x belongs to the first stage of the menu
sequence or x is chosen. Second, the chosen alternative is revealed to be un-
satisfactory and therefore the DM considers all alternatives in the choice set,
including x. These conditions are not necessary for x to be part of the DM’s
consideration set, because it can happen that y is satisfactory and x /∈ A1,
but x ∈ A¯. In this case x is part of the consideration set. However, since A¯
is not observable, it is impossible to infer from choices whether this occurs
or not. The next proposition summarizes this observation.
Proposition 6 (Revealed Attention) Suppose that c is an SCF2. Then,
x ∈ Γ(A,A1), only if either
1. x ∈ A1 ∨ x = c(A,A1) or
2. y = c(A,A1) and there exists a (B,B1) ∈ D2 such that y ∈ B1 and
c(B,B1) /∈ B1.
However, in order to provide an axiomatic characterization of the SCF2
we need a definition of attention. The only case in which we have problems in
inferring attention is when the chosen alternative is satisfactory and x /∈ A1.
In this case x is part of the DM’s consideration set if and only if x ∈ A¯,
where A¯ is unobservable. To solve this problem we use the following trick:
assume that the chosen alternative is revealed to be satisfactory and x /∈ A1.
Then, we assume that x attracts attention at (A,A1) whenever x is never
revealed to be preferred to the chosen alternative. In this way, even though
x was not part of the DM’s consideration set, assuming it to be considered
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does not affect neither revealed preference nor revealed satisfaction, because
we require that x is always revealed to be inferior to y. The next definition
formalizes this idea.
Definition 7 We say that x attracts attention at (A,A1) whenever
1. x ∈ A1 ∨ x = c(A,A1) or
2. x /∈ A1, y = c(A,A1) ∈ A1, and there is some (B,B1) ∈ D2 such that
y ∈ B1 and c(B,B1) /∈ B1.
3. x /∈ A1, y = c(A,A1) /∈ A1, and there is no (C,C1) ∈ D2 such that
y ∈ C1 and x = c(C,C1).
The axiom that characterizes the SCF2 is very similar to FAWARP. The
difference is that this version of FAWARP makes use of the concept of atten-
tion provided in definition 7.
Full Attention WARP under D2 (FAWARP2). Assume that x and
y attract attention at (A,A1) and (B,B1). Then, if x = c(A,A1), then
y 6= c(B,B1).
Theorem 2 An extended choice function c is an SCF2 if and only if c sat-
isfies FAWARP2.
We believe that this is an interesting result, because requiring to observe
much less data than under D1, we are still able to characterize the proposed
procedure and provide behavioral definitions of satisfaction and preference.
The only sacrifice, as proposition 6 suggests, is that under the domain D2 we
are able to infer attention only partially.
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2.3.3 Unobservable Menu Sequences
There are also circumstances in which it is also hard to assume that the first
stage of the menu sequence is observable. Consider a consumer who searches
for a new t-shirt in a market place. Assuming that in this case there is a set
of items that she necessarily considers appears to be unrealistic. Since there
are many entries to the market place, there are multiple ways in which she
can starts analyzing the products. In order to capture this kind of situations
we introduce another domain, D3, in which we assume that for each choice
problem we do not observe menu sequences, but only the choice set and the
choice made by the DM, as in the standard model.
Let D3 = P(X). Let C(A) ⊆ A be a choice correspondence defined on D3.
For each A ∈ P(X), let A be the set of menu sequences of the choice set A.
We define C to be a Satisficing Choice Correspondence whenever C records
the choices made by the DM who follows the proposed procedure under
multiple menu sequences. The next definition expresses this idea formally.
Definition 8 C is a Satisficing Choice Correspondence (SCC) if and only
if
C(A) =
⋃
{Aj}∈A
c(A, {Aj})
and c(A, {Aj}) is an SCF.
We first investigate the conditions under which we can unambiguously
state that an alternative is satisfactory. If an alternative x is acceptable,
then there is always a menu sequence at which x is chosen. This implies that
x is chosen for all A ∈ D3 such that x ∈ A, or, equivalently, x ∈ C(X). The
next proposition states that this condition is not only necessary, but also
sufficient for x to be a satisfactory alternative.
Proposition 7 (Revealed Satisfaction) Suppose that C is an SCC. Then,
x ∈ UC(X;xs) if and only if x ∈ C(X). Whenever this occurs we say that
x is revealed to be satisfactory.
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Proposition 7 suggests that an alternative is satisfactory whenever it is
chosen from all choice sets to which it belongs. Suppose that a choice set
contains at least two satisfactory alternatives. By proposition 7, all satis-
factory alternatives have to be chosen. This implies that under this domain
we cannot identify what is the ranking between two satisfactory alternatives.
On the contrary, we can infer preferences over unsatisfactory alternatives.
Assume that A = {x, y} and assume that x and y are revealed to be unsat-
isfactory. In this case, independently of the menu sequence, the DM always
pays attention to both alternatives. Therefore, if she prefers x to y, then
{x} = C(A). Conversely, if she prefers y to x, then {y} = C(A). Proposition
8 generalizes this idea and provides a behavioral definition of preference over
unsatisfactory alternatives. Let ¬S be the restriction of  to unsatisfactory
alternatives.
Proposition 8 (Revealed Preference) Suppose that c is an SCC. Then,
x ¬S y if and only if there is some A ∈ P(X) such that {x} = C(A) and
y ∈ A and some B ∈ P(X) such that x /∈ C(B).
Now we move to the axiomatic characterization.
We propose two properties. The first one is the well-known Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preference. The second one is called Maximal Indifference and
requires that if and alternative x is jointly chosen with another alternative
y, then x has to be chosen from all choice sets to which x belongs. The idea
behind this axiom is that y represents a kind of reference alternative, where
what makes y special is the fact that it is chosen with another alternative.
If x is chosen when also y is chosen, then this means that also x is a kind of
superior alternative. Therefore, it has to be always chosen.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Given x, y ∈ A∩B,
if x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(B).
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Maximal Indifference (MI). If x, y ∈ C(A), then x ∈ C(B) for all
B ∈ P(X) such that x ∈ B.
In appendix A we show that WARP and Maximal Indifference are in-
dependent. The next proposition establishes that these two properties are
necessary and sufficient for C to be an SCC.
Proposition 9 C is an SCC if and only if it satisfies WARP and Maximal
Indifference.
We draw two conclusions from this subsection. First, as proposition 9
suggests, the SCC model is a special case of standard maximization. In
particular C is not rationalizable by any weak order, but only by the weak
order that admits indifference only among maximal alternatives. Second, by
assuming that for each choice problem we cannot observe the menu sequence,
but only the choice set and the choice made by the DM, we are still able to
infer revealed satisfaction and revealed preference below the threshold.
2.4 Relationships with Choice From Lists
Rubinstein and Salant (2006: 5) propose a model called choice from lists in
which the DM does not perceive all alternatives in the choice set before de-
ciding, but examines alternatives one by one. Formally, given any two stages
Aj, Aj+1 of a menu sequence {Aj}, {Aj} is defined to be linear whenever
|Aj| = |Aj+1| − 1 for all j = 1, . . . , N − 1. Let DL ⊂ D1 be the domain D1,
where all menu sequences in D1 are linear. A Rubinstein and Salant’s list is
a linear menu sequence.
Rubinstein and Salant (2006: 6-10) characterize the set of choice functions
that maximize some weak preference relation, where indifference is resolved
according the position that alternatives take up in the lists: either the first
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or the last maximal alternative is selected. Formally, let R be a preference
relation on X and let δ : X → {1, 2} be a priority indicator, where δ(x) =
δ(y) whenever xIy. Given any list (A, {Aj}) ∈ DL, let DR,δ be a choice
function that chooses from A either the first or the last R-maximal element
of the list {Aj} depending on whether the δ-value of the R-maximal set is 1
or 2, respectively. Rubinstein and Salant (2006) show that an axiom called
List Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is necessary and sufficient for
the choice function from lists to be a DR,δ.
7
The next theorem establishes the relationship between the choice function
from lists DR,δ and the satisficing procedure proposed in this chapter.
Let I(R;\max) be the set of all indifference classes in the grand set X
according to the relation R apart from the class max(X;R).
Theorem 3 If the extended choice function c is an SCF, then the restriction
of c to DL is a DR,δ. Moreover, a DR,δ can be extended to an SCF if and
only if δ = 1 and the sets in I(R;\max) are singletons.
This result provides new insights into the link between the satisficing prin-
ciple and the choice function from lists DR,δ. Rubinstein and Salant (2006:
8) argue that DR,δ is consistent with it when R induces two indifference sets
of satisfactory and unsatisfactory alternatives being the δ-value equal to 1
and 2 for satisfactory and unsatisfactory alternatives, respectively. That is,
the DM chooses the first satisfactory alternative, if any, from any list. Oth-
erwise, she chooses the last alternative. An alternative interpretation that
emerges from Theorem 2 is that there can be more than two indifference
sets, provided that the non-maximal ones are singletons, all R-maximal al-
ternatives in the grand set X are satisfactory and, since δ = 1, the DM stops
searching as soon as she identifies the first one that she encounters in the
7List Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: assume that x = c(A, {Aj}). Then,
removing any alternative y 6= x from A does not change the choice, ceteris paribus (Ru-
binstein and Salant, 2006: 6-7).
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list and chooses it. If there is no satisfactory alternative, then she selects the
unique R-maximal one in the list.
The procedure proposed by Rubinstein and Salant (2006) encompasses a
more general class of models than ours. We limit ourselves to model the sat-
isficing heuristic. On the contrary, as explained in the previous paragraph,
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) propose a procedure that includes the satisfic-
ing heuristic as a special case. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of our
model that makes it complementary to theirs.
First, we generalize list to menu sequences. That is, we do not assume
that the DM necessarily examines alternatives one by one. There are many
real world examples that fit within our model, but do not within theirs. For
instance, assume that a person receives job offers sequentially in time. It
may happen that she receives two or more offers simultaneously. Alterna-
tively, think of a driver that has to go past a sequence of junctions. At any
junction the driver compares two alternatives simultaneously. In addition,
there is extensive evidence from experimental psychology that the visual field
may include more than one item. For instance, Pylyshyn and Storm (1988)
provide evidence that suggests that subjects are able to track up to a subset
of 5 items from a set of 10 identical randomly-moving objects in order to
distinguish a change in a target from a change in a distractor.8
Second, unlike Rubinstein and Salant (2006), our model allows for infer-
ring preferences above the threshold xs, not only under D1, but also when
the domain is D2 and only the first stage of the menu sequence is assumed
to be observable.
In order to make the analysis of the relationships between our model and
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) even richer further work could be done. On
the one hand, it would be interesting to characterize the SCF by using List
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. On the other hand, a generalization
of their results to menu sequences would shed further light on what are the
8Further evidence is provided by Pylyshyn and Annan (2006) and Franconeri et al.
(2008).
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implications of assuming sequences rather than lists.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposes a theory of boundedly rational choice within the re-
vealed preference approach in which the DM’s behavior is consistent with the
satisficing heuristic. We believe that this chapter has four main strengths.
First, we axiomatically characterize our model and investigate behavioral
definitions of satisfaction, attention, and preference under three different
domains. We think that this provides a rich and complete analysis, because
it allows us to understand how much of DM’s behavior we can infer depending
on how many data we can observe. Our results are summarized in table 2.1.
Domains
D1 D2 D3
Rev.Sat. yes yes yes
Rev.Att. yes partially no
Rev.Pref. yes yes only below xs
Axioms FAWARP FAWARP2 WARP and MI
Figure 2.1: A Summary of the Results
Under D1 we assume that for each choice problem we can observe not
only the choice set and the choice made by the DM, but also the entire menu
sequence. Under this domain we are able to infer both satisfaction, attention,
and preference and we show that Full Attention WARP is equivalent to the
proposed procedure, which incorporates standard maximization as a special
case. If we assume that we cannot observe the whole menu sequence, but
only the first stage, then we are able to fully infer satisfaction and preference,
but attention only partially. In this case FAWARP2 is shown to be equivalent
to our model. Finally, under D3 we assume that search order is unobservable.
In this case we are able to infer satisfaction and preference, but only below
the threshold xs. We also show that under D3 our procedure is a special case
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of standard maximization. In fact it is equivalent to WARP and Maximal
Indifference.
Second, we generalize the framework proposed by Rubinstein and Salant
(2006). Moreover, we show that even though their procedure encompasses a
more general class of models than ours there are some feature that make our
model complementary to theirs. For instance, unlike Rubinstein and Salant
(2006), our model allows us to infer preferences above the threshold not only
under D1, but also under D2.
Third, the issue of inferring the consideration set has become increas-
ingly important and studies have been carried out in various fields, such as
marketing science and psychology.9 For instance, Masatlioglu, Nakajima and
Ozbay (2009) approach the problem from a theoretical perspective and van
Nierop et al. (2010) propose a probabilistic model by using household panel
data. We provide a method for inferring the consideration set when DM’s
behavior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic.
Fourth, there is extensive evidence suggesting that often subjects do not
behave as if they were fully rational. Rather, as if they used simple heuris-
tics to make decisions (Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993; Gabaix et al.,
2006).10 Moreover, several experimental studies support the hypothesis that
subjects’ behavior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic. For instance,
Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009) propose an experiment in which they an-
alyze the source of choice errors by using choice process data and find that
that subjects behavior is consistent with a reservation-based model of sequen-
tial search. Reutskaja et al. (2010) use eye-tracking to investigate consumer
search dynamics in a context characterized by time pressure. They show that
subjects tend to choose the optimal alternative among the discovered ones
and that search behavior is compatible with an hybrid of the optimal search
and the satisficing model.
Our work could be further extended by assuming that the threshold is
9See sections 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5.
10See section 1.5.
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not fixed, but can vary depending on the complexity of the choice problem.
The more complex the problem, the more the threshold depreciates. On the
contrary, the simpler the problem, the more the threshold appreciates. We
think that this would make the model more realistic.
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Chapter 3
Does Uncertainty Help
Bounded Rationality? An IO
study
3.1 Introduction
Standard decision theory assumes that the decision-maker is fully rational.
That is, she knows all alternatives in the choice set before deciding and always
picks the best alternative according to her preference relation. However,
many experimental studies have shown that often decision-makers are not
maximizers, but use simple heuristics to make decisions.1 In response to this
growing literature, theorists have proposed new models that assume decision-
makers to be boundedly rational.2 We believe that the natural following step
is to apply the assumption of bounded rationality to more concrete economic
problems.
We decided to analyze the impact of bounded rationality on industrial
organization (IO) for two main reasons. First, as Spiegler (2011: 4) argues,
1See section 1.5.
2See section 1.3.
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IO is a very important area of economics.3 Second, in recent years an increas-
ing number of studies have been carried out in this field (Eliaz and Spiegler,
2009; Piccione and Spiegler, 2010; Spiegler, 2011).
As Ran Spiegler (2011) points out,
bounded rationality is another potential source of market fric-
tion. When some agents have limited understanding of their
market environment (including their own behavior in certain cir-
cumstances), limited ability to process information, and prefer-
ences that are highly unstable, context-dependent and malleable,
market outcomes may differ in interesting and economically sig-
nificant ways from the rational-consumer benchmark. Moreover,
introducing boundedly rational agents into our market models
may challenge conventional wisdom regarding the welfare prop-
erties of market interactions (Spiegler, 2011: 2).
We focus on analyzing the effects of uncertainty on bounded rationality.
We define a consumer to be boundedly rational whenever she behaves con-
sistently with the ‘satisficing’ heuristic (Simon, 1955). That is, she discovers
and analyzes alternatives sequentially and stops searching as soon as she
identifies the first alternative that she judges to be acceptable. In contrast,
a fully rational consumer knows all alternatives before deciding and always
picks the best available good.
We expect that if firms know with certainty the consumer’s type, then
they will exploit this informative advantage to maximize profits by always
supplying an optimal alternative to the fully rational consumer and the min-
imal acceptable alternative to the boundedly rational one. The hypothe-
sis that boundedly rational consumers are subject to exploitation is well-
documented in the literature (Spiegler, 2006b;a; Rubinstein and Spiegler,
2008).4 We are interested in investigating whether the fact that firms are
3Spiegler (2011) has not been published yet, but the introduction is available on-line
at http://www.tau.ac.il/ rani/briocontents.pdf.
4See also section 1.4.
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uncertain about the consumer’s type increases consumers welfare. That is,
whether uncertainty induces firms to supply the optimal alternative, given
that there is a positive probability that consumers are boundedly rational.
We believe that it is worth performing such an analysis because it might lead
to interesting policy implications.
We first investigate a model of quality competition. A store sells n ≥ 2
products and is restocked by n firms. Each firm produces one good and has to
decide its quality. The higher the quality of a good, the higher its production
cost. Whereas fully rational consumers know all alternatives that are sold in
the store in advance and always pick the best alternative, boundedly rational
ones examine the products sequentially and stop searching as soon as they
identify the first satisfactory alternative. We show that if consumers are
fully rational then in equilibrium firms supply the good with the highest
quality. On the contrary, if consumers are boundedly rational, firms supply
the minimal satisfactory alternative, which can be non-optimal. We find that
under uncertainty firms supply the optimal product only if the probability
that the consumer is fully rational is above some threshold. If the threshold is
not met, firms supply some intermediate alternative between the optimal and
the minimal satisfactory one. In this model uncertainty makes the boundedly
rational consumer better off.
Secondly, we analyze a strategic interaction between a consumer and a
firm that play a sequential game. The consumer has to decide first whether
or not to enter the firm. Then, if the consumer decides to enter, the firm can
choose to supply either an optimal or a satisfactory product, provided that
the production cost of the former is greater than the latter’s. We assume
that the fully rational consumer buys only optimal products, whereas the
boundedly rational one buys also satisfactory goods. The main result is
that the fully rational consumer is better off when there is certainty about
consumers’ rationality, because in equilibrium she always gets the optimal
good. On the contrary, when there is uncertainty, she gets either the optimal
product or she does not buy anything. The boundedly rational consumer,
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instead, is better off under uncertainty because if the posterior probability
that the consumer is fully rational is sufficiently high, then she gets the
optimal product in equilibrium.
Thirdly, we investigate how bounded rationality affects the equilibrium
outcome in a model of monopolistic screening. A monopolist supplies a two-
attribute good. There are two types of consumers: the fully rational one
follows a compensatory and the boundedly rational the satisficing decision
strategy, which is noncompensatory. The former refers to those individuals
that make tradeoffs between attributes and the latter refers to individuals
that do not. The firm does not know with certainty whether consumers are of
the first or of the second type. We show that whereas the boundedly rational
consumer gets always the minimal satisfactory alternative, the fully rational
one is better off under uncertainty because under certain conditions she gets
more than her reservation utility. In particular this happens whenever the
threshold of the boundedly rational consumer are particularly high. In this
model uncertainty does not help bounded rationality.
We then conclude the chapter by providing some suggestions for policy-
makers. For instance, in the monopolistic screening model we found that the
fact that fully rational consumer’s preferences are compensatory prevents
the boundedly rational consumers from getting something more than the
minimal satisfactory alternative. That is, compensatory preferences always
allow firms to give the minimum to the boundedly rational consumer and, by
moving along indifference curves, the reservation utility to the fully rational
one. Given this result, we suggest to develop a policy aimed at reducing
the probability that compensation between attributes takes place. As an
example, policy-makers could incentivize advertisement strategies, in which
advantages and disadvantages of similar products are clearly highlighted in
order to minimize the probability that consumers perceive those as substi-
tutes.
This study is closely related to the literature on bounded rationality and
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IO.5 To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that investigate the
effects of uncertainty on IO by defining boundedly rational consumers as
individuals who behave according to the satisficing heuristic.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.3 investigates a model of
quality competition; Section 3.3 examines a signalling game; Section 4.4 an-
alyzes a model of monopolistic screening; Section 5.5 concludes. Throughout
the chapter the acronym ‘FRC’ stands for ‘fully rational consumer’ and the
acronym ‘BRC’ for ‘boundedly rational consumer’.
3.2 Quality Competition
Consider the following example. Suppose that a consumer wants to buy a
new guitar. There is a big music store in the city, called ‘Hendrix Music
Store’, that sells more than hundred different kinds of guitar. The set of all
guitars in the store represents the choice set. If the consumer is an FRC,
then she knows all products in the store before making the decision. On
the other hand, if she is a BRC and follows the satisficing heuristic, she
discovers and analyzes alternatives sequentially. Moreover, since she is not
aware of how the choice set looks like a priori, she explores it and stops
searching as soon as she identifies the first acceptable alternative. Assume, for
instance, that she does not want to spend more than 2.500 Euros, but needs
an high-quality musical instrument.6 Let a guitar with these characteristics
be called satisfactory. Whereas the FRC’s choice is the best guitar of the
store according to her preferences, which is, for instance, the Gibson Les Paul
Traditional Desert Burst that costs 1.630 Euros, the BRC’s depends on the
extent to which she explores the choice set. For instance, assume that she
examines the department of guitars from left to right and suppose that the
5See section 1.4 for a brief literature review.
6High-quality guitars are, for instance, ‘Fender’, ‘Gibson’, ‘Ibanez’, etc.
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first satisfactory alternative she encounters is the Fender Showmaster Elite
Cherry Sunburst/Ebony that costs 2.200 Euros. Since this product is judged
to be satisfactory, then the BRC stops searching and buys it.
The above story highlights the fact that if a consumer follows the satis-
ficing heuristic, then she discovers and analyzes alternatives sequentially and
may end up with an inferior product. Indeed, the ‘Gibson’ is Pareto-superior
to the ‘Fender’, because it is of the same quality but costs less. The goal
of this section is to investigate the extent to which the fact that consumers
can be either FRCs or BRCs affects an n-firm market that compete within
a given store.
We first introduce some notation and definitions. A binary relation  on
a set X is defined as a subset of the Cartesian product of X with itself. A
binary relation  is complete whenever either x  y or y  x or both. Given
x, y, z ∈ X, a binary relation  is transitive, when x  y and y  z imply
that x  z. A weak order is a transitive and complete binary relation. Let
= {(x, y) ∈ X ×X|(x  y) ∧ ¬(y  x)} denote the asymmetric part of 
and let ∼= {(x, y) ∈ X ×X|(x  y) ∧ (y  x)} denote its symmetric part.
Let X be a finite set of alternatives. The market is composed of identical
firms that have to decide simultaneously which product x ∈ X to produce.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players (firms), where n = |N | ≥ 2 is the
number of firms acting in the market. Let Si ⊆ X be firm i’s set of strategies,
with i ∈ N . A firm i’s pure strategy is denoted by xi ∈ Si. A strategy profile
is a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S = ×ni=1Si. All products x ∈ X, if sold, yield
the same level of revenue, which is normalized to 1. Let c : X → <+ be the
cost function, where c(x) is the cost of producing one alternative x ∈ X. The
goal of firms is to maximize profit.
We assume that there is a unique consumer, that can be either an FRC or
a BRC. Let  be a weak order on X that represents consumer’s preferences.
Let xmax ∈ {x ∈ X|@y ∈ X such that y  x} be a -maximal alternative
in X and let xmin ∈ {x ∈ X|@y ∈ X such that x  y} be a -minimal one.
Let xs ∈ X be a -minimal satisfactory alternative available in X. That
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Figure 3.1: Alternatives are ordered according to the strict linear order O,
where 1O2O . . . On.
is, xs is a lowest-quality alternative that is judged to be satisfactory by the
BRC and all alternatives that are at least as good as xs are considered to be
satisfactory as well. Obviously, the FRC does not care about xs because she
always searches for the optimum.
We also assume that the higher the quality of good x the higher its
production cost, that is, c(x) > c(y) if and only if x  y, provided that
c(xmax) < 1
n
.7 Let pii(x) be firm i’s profit (or payoff) when the played strategy
profile is x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S with i ∈ N .
Finally, we assume that the products supplied by the n firms are ordered
according to the strict linear order O.8 In particular, given i, j ∈ N , if iOj,
then the alternative supplied by firm i precedes j’s. We can think of O as
some spatial ordering according to which alternatives are arranged.9 Figure
3.2 shows an example.
If the consumer is an FRC, then she knows the characteristics of all al-
ternatives in advance and picks the maximal available alternative according
to . If all firms produce a good of the same quality, the FRC chooses
randomly. On the other hand, if the consumer is a BRC and follows the
7We assume that c(xmax) < 1n in order to make the strategy of supplying some alter-
native feasible.
8A strict linear order is a transitive, complete, and antisymmetric binary relation. A
binary relation is antisymmetric whenever, given x, y ∈ X, x  y and y  x imply x = y.
9Notice that O is defined on N and not on X. Nevertheless, we interpret it as an
ordering over supplied alternatives, because each firm i supplies exactly one good xi.
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satisficing heuristic, then she explores alternatives sequentially according to
O. In particular, we assume that she starts with firm i’s product with proba-
bility 1
n
. If it is satisfactory, then she stops searching and buys it. Otherwise,
she examines firm j’s product, provided that iOj and there is no k ∈ N such
that iOkOj. Again, if this product is satisfactory, she stops searching and
buys it. Otherwise, she goes one and the procedure is the same as before. If
she examines the product supplied by the O-minimal firm in N and finds it
not to be satisfactory and there is some j ∈ N such that jOi, then she ex-
amines the goods supplied by the firms in the set {i ∈ N |jOi} still according
to the relation O. If all alternatives are explored and are of the same quality,
then the BRC chooses randomly.
Formally, let LC(O; i) = {j ∈ N |iOj} and UC(O; i) = {j ∈ N |jOi} be
the lower and the upper contour-set of i according to the relation O, respec-
tively. Let OLC,i = O ∩ (LC(O; i)× LC(O; i)) and OUC,i = O ∩ (UC(O; i)×
UC(O; i)). Let (Oi)i∈N be a family of binary relations on N , where Oi sat-
isfies:
• {i} = max(N ;Oi),
• Oi ∩OLC,i = OLC,i,
• Oi ∩OUC,i = OUC,i, and
• given k, j ∈ N , kOij whenever k ∈ LC(O; i) and j ∈ UC(O; i), pro-
vided that LC(O; i) 6= ∅ 6= UC(O; i).
In short the BRC examines alternatives according to Oi with probability
1
n
for all i ∈ N . See figure 3.2 for an example.
Clearly, there are many other ways in which the BRC could explore alter-
natives. In this study we focus on the above search procedure, but extensions
of the model could encompass other procedures by which the consideration
set is constructed. For instance, more advertised products may have an
higher probability of being discovered first.
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Figure 3.2: The BRC examines alternatives according to the strict linear
order Oi with probability
1
n
, for all i ∈ N .
Let this game be called ‘n-firm game’. The analysis of the equilibrium
market is restricted to pure-strategy equilibria.
3.2.1 Certainty About the Consumer’s Type
Assume first that firms know that the consumer is an FRC.
If the consumer is an FRC, then she knows the products that all firms
produce in advance. She picks the best alternative according to her preference
relation and if products are of the same quality then she chooses randomly.
Given a strategy profile x, let n(i,x) = |{j ∈ N |xj ∼ xi}| be the number
of firms that supply an alternative xj of the same quality as xi. Formally,
firm i’s payoff function is defined as follows.
pii(x) =
{
1
n(i,x)
− c(xi) if xi  xj for all j ∈ N
−c(xi) otherwise
Assume that firm i supplies an alternative xi  xj for all j ∈ N . The
magnitude of profits depends on how many firms supply alternatives of ex-
actly the same quality as xi. For instance, if xi  xj for all j ∈ N , then
n(i,x) = 1 and pii(x) = 1 − c(xi). On the other hand, if xi ∼ xj for all
j ∈ N , then n(i,x) = n and pii(x) = 1n − c(xi). Whenever 1 < n(i,x) < n,
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pii(x) =
1
n(i,x)
− c(xi). Hence, the greater n(i,x), the lower profits.
Suppose then that xi ≺ xj for some j ∈ N \ {i}. Then, independently of
how many firms supply an alternative superior to xi firm i’s revenues are zero,
i.e., pii(x) = −c(xi), because the FRC never buys a dominated alternative.
The game of figure 3.3 represents the n-firm game in which the consumer
is an FRC, there are two firms (n = 2), and X = {xmin, x′, xmax}, where
xmin ≺ x′ ≺ xmax.
xmin x′ xmax
xmin 12 − c(xmin), 12 − c(xmin) −c(xmin), 1− c(x′) −c(xmin), 1− c(xmax)
x′ 1− c(x′), −c(xmin) 12 − c(x′), 12 − c(x′) −c(x′), 1− c(xmax)
xmax 1− c(xmax), −c(xmin) 1− c(xmax), −c(x′) 12 − c(xmax), 12 − c(xmax)
Figure 3.3: The n-firm game, where the consumer is an FRC, n = 2, X =
{xmin, x′, xmax}, and xmin ≺ x′ ≺ xmax
The row player is firm 1 and the column player is firm 2. For instance,
suppose that firm 1 plays xmax and firm 2 xmin. Since xmax  xmin, then the
FRC buys xmax. Therefore, firm 1’s profits are 1 − c(xmin) and firm 2’s are
−c(xmin).
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the n-firm game,
where the consumer is an FRC.
Proposition 10 In the n-firm game in which the consumer is an FRC, X
is finite, and n ≥ 2, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
which firms play xmax and earn profits equal to 1
n
− c(xmax).
If firms play xmax, then they obtain the lowest level of profit and con-
sumers get their most preferred object. Moreover, limn→+∞ 1n − c(xmax) = 0,
that is, if the number of firms in the market tends to infinity, then firms’ prof-
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its tend to zero. For this reason the equilibrium characterized in Proposition
10 (xmax = (xmaxi )i∈N) is called competitive outcome.
This result is not surprising. Since the FRC knows all alternatives before
deciding, then she always picks the best available good. This implies that
there cannot be equilibria in which firms supply a non-maximal alternative.
The reason is that each firm has an incentive to raise a little bit the quality
in order to attract the FRC. This mechanism pushes the quality upwards
and leads firms to play xmax, the product with the highest quality.
Moreover this result resembles Bertrand competition, that is, two firms
are sufficient for the equilibrium market to be perfectly competitive.
Assume now that firms know that the consumer is a BRC.
A BRC follows the satisficing heuristic. That is, she examines alternatives
sequentially and stops searching as soon as she identifies the first satisfactory
alternative. Moreover, if all products are discovered and are of the same
quality, then she chooses randomly.
Assume firm i’s perspective. Since the BRC examines alternatives sequen-
tially according to Oj with probability
1
n
for all j ∈ N , then the probability
that the BRC actually examines firm i’s product crucially depends on what
the firms that Oj-precede firm i do. For instance, assume that some firm
that Oj-precedes i supplies a satisfactory alternative. In this case, the BRC
does not even consider firm i’s product at Oj, because she stops searching
before encountering it. In the definition of the payoff function we have to
consider this possibility.
Let Pj(i) = {k ∈ N |kOji} for any j ∈ N\{i}. This set is never empty and
contains all firms whose products Oj-precede firm i’s at Oj.
10 Next, given
a strategy profile x, we introduce an indicator function Ij(i,x) that tells us
whether or not firm i’s product belongs to the BRC’s consideration set at
Oj. In particular, if Ij(i,x) = 1, then all products supplied by the firms that
Oj-precede firm i are unsatisfactory and the BRC considers xi at Oj. On the
10We do not need to consider the case in which i = j, because the first alternatives that
the BRC examines under Oi is precisely xi.
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contrary, if Ij(i,x) = 0, then there is at least one firm that Oj-precede firm
i that supplies a satisfactory product and, therefore, xi is not part of the
BRC’s consideration set at Oj. Let UC(X;xs) = {x ∈ X|x  xs} be the
upper-contour set of xs according to , representing the set of satisfactory
alternatives available in the grand set X. Formally, Ij(i,x) is defined as
follows: for any j ∈ N \ {i},
Ij(i,x) =
{
1 if xk /∈ UC(X;xs) for all k ∈ Pj(i)
0 otherwise
Since the BRC examines alternatives sequentially according to Ok with
probability 1
n
for all k ∈ N , then the probability that xi is part of her
consideration set is
∑
j 6=i Ij(i,x)
n−1 +
1
n
. The second addendum captures the state
of the world in which the BRC starts by exploring firm i’s product (xi is
always part of BRC’s consideration set at Oi). Let q =
∑
j 6=i Ij(i,x)
n−1 +
1
n
. Notice
that q ∈ [ 1
n
, 1], where q = 1
n
when all firms supply a satisfactory product and
q = 1 when only firm i supplies a satisfactory good.
Formally, firm i’s payoff function is defined as follows.
pii(x) =

q (1− c(xi))− (1− q) (c(xi)) if xi  xs
1
n(i,x)
− c(xi) if (xi, xj /∈ UC(X;xs))
and (xi  xj )∀j ∈ N
−c(xi) otherwise
Assume first that xi is satisfactory. In this case, firm i’s revenues are
equal to 1, only if the BRC considers xi. We know that this happens with
probability q. Conversely, its revenues are equal to zero with probability
(1 − q), because if (1 − q) > 0, then this implies that at some Oj there is
a firm, which precedes firm i, whose product is satisfactory. Hence, firm i’s
profits are q (1− c(xi))− (1− q) (c(xi)).
Next, suppose that all firms supply an unsatisfactory product, but xi 
xj ∀j ∈ N . In this case, the BRC’s consideration set includes all the supplied
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alternatives. That is, the BRC behaves as if she was an FRC. Since xi is at
least as good as all the supplied products, then firm i’s profits are 1
n(i,x)
−c(xi).
Finally, notice that if either xi is unsatisfactory and some other firm j sup-
plies a satisfactory alternative (i.e., xi /∈ UC(X;xs) 3 xj for some j) or all
the supplied alternatives are unsatisfactory and xi is worse than some other
alternative xk (i.e., (xj /∈ UC(X;xs)∀j ∈ N) and (xk  xi for some k 6=
i)), then firm i’s revenues are zero. Hence, its profits are equal to −c(xi).
The game of figure 3.4 represents the n-firm game in which the consumer
is a BRC, there are two firms (n = 2), X = {xmin, xs, xmax}, xmin ≺ xs ≺
xmax, and UC(X;xs) = {xs, xmax}.
xmin xs xmax
xmin 12 − c(xmin), 12 − c(xmin) −c(xmin), 1− c(xs) −c(xmin), 1− c(xmax)
xs 1− c(xs), −c(xmin) 12 − c(xs), 12 − c(xs) 12 − c(xs), 12 − c(xmax)
xmax 1− c(xmax), −c(xmin) 12 − c(xmax), 12 − c(xs) 12 − c(xmax), 12 − c(xmax)
Figure 3.4: The n-firm game, where the consumer is a BRC, there are two
firms (n = 2), X = {xmin, xs, xmax}, xmin ≺ xs ≺ xmax, and UC(X;xs) =
{xs, xmax}
Notice that the game of figure 3.4 (in which the consumer is a BRC) is
different, ceteris paribus, from the game of figure 3.3 (in which the consumer
is an FRC). For instance, assume that firms play (xs, xmax). In the case in
which the consumer is an FRC firm 1’s profits are −c(xs) and firm 2’s are
1 − c(xmax). On the other hand, if the consumer is a BRC, then firm 1’s
profits are 1
2
− c(xs) and firm 2’s are 1
2
− c(xmax). The reason is that for the
BRC all products that are at least as good as xs are satisfactory. Obviously,
if xmax ∼ xs, then the BRC is actually an FRC and the two games coincide.
Therefore, from now on we assume that UC(X;xs) contains at least two
indifference classes.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the n-firm game in
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which the consumer is a BRC.
Proposition 11 In the n-firm game in which the consumer is a BRC, X
is finite, and n ≥ 2, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
which firms play xs and earn profits equal to 1
n
− c(xs).
Proposition 11 suggests that bounded rationality on the demand side
implies that firms supply precisely the minimal satisfactory alternative xs,
which can be non-optimal. The fact that the consumer follows the satisficing
heuristic attenuates the mechanism of competition and induces firms not to
supply the maximal good.
The intuition behind this result is that as long as firms supply a good
worse than xs, then the same mechanism of competition described above is
at work. That is, each firm i, independently of its positioning according to
Oi, has an incentive to deviate and raise the quality in order to capture the
BRC. The reason is that if firm i produces a good inferior to xs, then the
BRC keeps searching looking for a better alternative and acts as if she was
an FRC.
On the contrary, assume that firms supply some good y -superior to
xs. In this case each firm i’s profits are 1 − c(y) with probability 1
n
and
−c(y) with probability 1− 1
n
. Notice that as long as y  xs all products are
satisfactory and, therefore, the BRC always stops searching at max(N,Oi) for
all i. This implies that each firm i has an incentive to deviate to z, provided
that y  z  xs, because its profits are equal to 1− c(z) with probability 1
n
and to −c(z), otherwise, given that c(y) > c(z). This argument and the one
described in the previous paragraph imply that firms play xs in equilibrium.
Let xmin = (xmini )i∈N be called collusive outcome because firms playing
this strategy profile make the highest amount of profits and consumers get
their least preferred alternative.
Notice that if xs /∈ min(X,) and xs /∈ max(X,), that is, if the mini-
mal satisfactory alternative is neither minimal nor maximal in X, then the
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Nash equilibrium of the n-firm game played by the BRC lies between the
collusive and the competitive outcome: firms earn less than in the collusive
outcome and more than in the competitive one. The BRC, instead, buys an
intermediate good with respect to the relation . This result resembles the
Nash equilibrium of the Cournot model.
3.2.2 Uncertainty About the Consumer’s Type
Suppose that firms do not know with certainty whether the consumer is an
FRC or a BRC. In particular, let ρ be the probability that the consumer is
an FRC. Let piui = ρpi
FRC
i + (1 − ρ)piBRCi be firm i’s profit function under
uncertainty, where piFRCi and pi
BRC
i are firm i’s profit functions when the
consumer is an FRC and a BRC, respectively.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the n-firm game in
which there is uncertainty about whether the consumer is an FRC or a BRC.
Proposition 12 In the n-firm game in which the consumer is an FRC with
probability ρ and a BRC with probability (1−ρ), X is finite, and n ≥ 2, there
exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which firms play xmax and
earn profits equal to 1
n
−c(xmax) only if ρ ≥ ρ¯ = n(c(xmax)−c(xs)). Moreover,
if ρ < ρ¯ firms do not supply alternatives -worse than xs in equilibrium.
Proposition 12 suggests that the BRC is better off under uncertainty,
because under certainty she gets a minimal satisfactory alternative xs. On
the contrary, under uncertainty she gets her most preferred good xmax if ρ ≥ ρ¯
and at least xs, otherwise.
If the supplied alternatives are unsatisfactory, then the FRC and the BRC
behave exactly in the same way in this model. They are distinguishable only
when some satisfactory alternatives are supplied. In particular, unlike the
FRC, the BRC stops searching as soon as she identifies the first satisfactory
alternative, even though it is not optimal. On the contrary, the FRC is
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satisfied only when she chooses precisely the optimum. The intuition behind
the result of proposition 12 is that for a sufficiently high ρ, the FRC’s desire
to get the optimum has an higher impact on the profit function piu then BRC’
satisfycing attitudes. Therefore, firms find more convenient to supply xmax
rather than xs.
The threshold ρ¯ = n(c(xmax) − c(xs)) increases in n and c(xmax) and
decreases in c(xs). On the one hand, it seems intuitive that the threshold
decreases as the difference between c(xmax) and c(xs) decreases. The reason
is that if c(xmax) and c(xs) get closer and closer to each other, then xs gets
closer and closer to xmax in terms of preferences . This makes the BRC
progressively more and more similar to the FRC, because the set UC(, xs)
shrinks and less and less alternatives are considered to be satisfactory. Hence,
a lower ρ¯ is needed to induce firms to supply xmax.
On the other hand, the fact that the threshold increases in n seems coun-
terintuitive, because typically one is led to think that consumer welfare in-
creases as the market becomes more and more competitive. Our interpreta-
tion is that to an increase in the number of firms acting in the market corre-
sponds an higher probability that the BRC stops searching before exploring
the whole choice set. This increases the chances that the optimal alternative
xmax is not part of the BRC’s consideration set and, consequently, reduces
firms’ incentives to supply xmax. This is why an higher ρ is required in order
to induce firms to supply xmax.
Finally, notice that the FRC is worse off under uncertainty. In fact, if ρ is
below the threshold, then xmax is not an equilibrium. The worst alternative
that the FRC can get in equilibrium is xs. Firms, instead, are clearly better
off under certainty when the consumer is a BRC.
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3.3 Signalling
Consider the following example. Assume that a consumer needs to buy a
new camera. There is a beautiful store in the center of the city that sells
either high-quality or intermediate-quality cameras. Suppose that she decides
to visit it. The shop assistant knows that there are mainly two types of
consumers. The first one buys only if she finds high-quality cameras. The
second one buys even though she finds intermediate-quality ones. The shop
assistant has to decide what kind of camera to show first. He is perfectly
aware of the fact that the consumer’s opinion about the store is strongly
influenced by the first product he shows. For instance, if the first showed
camera is a swindle, then the consumer is led to think that the store does not
sell good products and that it is better to change place. The shop assistant is
also aware of the fact that showing the intermediate-quality camera requires
little time, because this kind of product is pretty simple to use. On the
other hand, explaining how the high-quality camera works requires a lot of
effort, more time, and concentration of the consumer. Moreover, the cost-
opportunity of doing that is high, because it prevents him from carrying out
other important tasks in the store. His problem is to choose what kind of
cameras to show first, given that he does not know whether the consumer he
is facing is of the first or of the second type.
The goal of this section is to analyze a situation analogous to the one de-
scribed in the above example. That is, a firm has to decide whether to supply
either an optimal or a satisfactory good. There are two types of consumers:
FRCs and BRCs. FRCs are willing to buy products only if they are maximal
according to their preference relation. On the other hand, BRCs buy not
only maximal products, but also satisfactory ones. The firm’s objective is
to maximize profits, given that she does not know whether consumers are
FRCs or BRCs and the production cost of the optimal good is greater than
the satisfactory good’s one.
Formally, let N = {1, 2} be the set of players, where player 1 is the con-
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sumer and player 2 is the firm. The consumer has to decide first whether to
enter or not the firm. The consumer’s pure strategy space is S1 = {E,NE},
where E stands for “enter” and NE “don’t enter”. Then, if she decides to
enter, then the firm has to choose whether to supply either an optimal or
a satisfactory product. The firm’s pure strategy space is S2 = {xmax, xs},
where the strategy xmax represents the choice of producing the optimal good
and xs represents the choice of supplying the satisfactory one. The cost
c(xmax) of producing xmax is assumed to be greater than the cost c(xs) of
producing xs, where c(xmax) < 1. The consumer always prefers xmax to xs.
If the consumer chooses NE, then the consumer gets the reservation utility
and the firm the reservation profit p¯i. A sold product yields a positive level
of revenues, which is normalized to 1. The goal of the firm is to maximize
profits.
Consider first the case in which the consumer is a FRC. If the FRC
chooses E and the firm supplies xmax, then the FRC buys xmax, her utility is
u(xmax), and firm’s profits are 1− c(xmax). On the contrary, if she chooses E
and the firm supplies xs, then the FRC does not buy xs, her utility is u(xs),
and firm’s profits are −c(xs). In this case the FRC does not buy anything
because xs is not optimal. Moreover, since she is wasting time in the store,
then we assume that u(xmax) > u¯ > u(xs). The firm, on the other hand,
makes negative profits because xs is not sold.
Next, consider the case in which the consumer is a BRC. If the firm
supplies xs, then the BRC buys xs, her utility is v(xs), and firm’s profits
are 1 − c(xs). On the other hand, if the firm supplies xmax, then the BRC
still buys the supplied product, her utility is v(xmax), and firm’s profits are
1− c(xmax). Since the consumer prefers the optimal to the satisfactory good,
then we assume that v(xmax) > v(xs). However, since the consumer is a BRC
and xs is satisfactory, then v(xs) > v¯.
The analysis is restricted to pure-strategy equilibria.
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3.3.1 Certainty About the Consumer’s Type
Consider first the situation in which the consumer is a FRC. Figure 3.5
represents the game described above, where the consumer is a FRC.
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Figure 3.5: The game in which the consumer is a FRC
The firm supplies the maximal good xmax if and only if 1 − c(xmax) >
−c(xs). Since this inequality is always true, then the firm’s optimal choice is
xmax. Hence, the consumer’s best response is to enter, because u(xmax) > 0.
The conclusion is that there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which
the consumer buys and the firm supplies the maximal alternative.
Consider now figure 3.6 that represents the game described above, where
the firm knows that the consumer is a BRC.
The firm supplies xs if and only if 1−c(xs) > 1−c(xmax), that is, c(xmax) >
c(xs). Since this inequality is always true, then the optimal strategy for the
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Figure 3.6: The game in which the consumer is a BRC
firm is to supply xs. Hence, the consumer’s best response is to enter because
v(xs) > v¯. The conclusion is that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the game of figure 3.6 is (E, xs).
Notice that certainty about consumer’s rationality induces the firm to put
into practice a sort of contingent strategy: (i) supply the maximal product
when facing a FRC and (ii) supply the satisfactory alternative when fac-
ing a BRC. This result is not surprising because, contingent on the specific
situation, the firm simply maximizes its profits.
3.3.2 Uncertainty About the Consumer’s Type
Suppose now that the firm does not know with certainty whether the con-
sumer is a FRC or a BRC. In particular assume that the nature selects with
a certain probability what is the type of consumer. If the state is FRC, then
the game of figure 3.5 is played. On the contrary, if the state is BRC, then
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the game of figure 3.6 is played. The firm has a prior, denoted by p(·), about
what is the state of nature, which is common knowledge between players.
This situation is depicted in figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: The game in which the firm does not know with certainty whether
the consumer is a FRC or a BRC
Notice that the game of figure 3.7 is a signalling game.11
At this point one could wonder what kind of strategy the firm will follow.
11In a basic signalling game player 1 is the sender (of a signal), has private information
about her type, and chooses a strategy contingent on her type. Player 2, whose type is
common knowledge, observes the strategy played by player 1 and chooses a strategy. Let Θ
be the set of player 1’s types. It is assumed that player’s 2 prior probability about player’s
1 type is denoted by p(θ) and is common knowledge. Let xi ∈ Si be a pure strategy, where
Si is player i’s strategy space, with i = 1, 2. A player 1’s mixed strategy σ1(·|θ) prescribes
a probability distribution over the set S1 for each type θ ∈ Θ. A player 2’s mixed strategy
σ2(·|σ1) prescribes a probability distribution over S1 for each strategy σ1 played by player
1. Player i’s payoff is denoted by ui(σ1, σ2, θ) (Fundenberg and Tirole, 1991a: 324-325).
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In order to answer this question we compute the perfect Bayesian equilibria
of the game of figure 3.7.12 Remember that under certainty the firm behaves
according to the contingent strategy, that is, playing xmax when the consumer
is a FRC and xs when she is a BRC.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibria of the game of figure
3.7.
Proposition 13 In the game of figure 3.7, there are two sets of pure-strategy
perfect Bayesian equilibria:
(i) the FRC plays E, the BRC plays E, the firm supplies xmax, and the
posterior probabilities are p(FRC|E) ∈ (c(xmax)−c(xs), 1] and p(FRC|NE) ∈
[0, 1];
(ii) the FRC plays NE, the BRC plays E, the firm supplies xs, and the
posterior probabilities are p(FRC|E) = 0 and p(FRC|NE) = 1.
12A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a signalling game is a strategy profile σ∗ and pos-
terior beliefs µ(·|x1) such that
(i) ∀θ ∈ Θ, σ∗1 ∈ arg max
σ1
u1(σ1, σ
∗
2 , θ)
(ii) ∀x1, σ∗2(·|x1) ∈ arg max
σ2
Σθµ(θ, x1)u2(x1, σ2, θ)
and
µ(θ|x1) = p(θ)σ∗1(x1|θ)/Σθ′∈Θp(θ′)σ∗1(x1|θ′)
if Σθ′∈Θp(θ′)σ∗1(x1|θ′) > 0
and µ(x1|θ) is any probability distribution over Θ if Σθ′∈Θp(θ′)σ∗1(x1|θ′) = 0 (Funden-
berg and Tirole, 1991a: 325-326). Since the game of figure 3.7 is a signalling game with
two types, then a strategy profile is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if it is a
sequential equilibrium (Fundenberg and Tirole, 1991b).
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In the first set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of Proposition 13 both types
of consumer enter and the firm supply the optimal good xmax and in the sec-
ond the FRC stays out, the BRC enters, and the firm supplies the satisfactory
good xs. This result has different implications on FRC’s and BRC’s wel-
fare. In equilibrium the FRC is worse off under uncertainty than under cer-
tainty, because under certainty the contingent strategy implies that she gets
u(xmax) for sure and under uncertainty she gets either u(xmax) or u¯, where
u¯ < u(xmax). On the contrary, in equilibrium the BRC is better off under un-
certainty. The reason is that under certainty she gets v(xs) for sure and under
uncertainty she gets either v(xs) or v(xmax), where v(xs) < v(xmax). That
is, in equilibrium the BRC’ payoffs under uncertainty are Pareto-superior to
the BRC’ payoffs under certainty. The intuition behind this result is that
under uncertainty as long as the posterior probability of the consumer being
a FRC is sufficiently high (p(FRC|E) > c(xmax)− c(xs)), then it is too risky
for the firm to play xs: if the firm chose xs, the FRC would punish the firm
by not buying inducing a negative profit of −c(xs). In order to prevent this
outcome, the firm chooses the optimal alternative xmax even though there is
a positive probability that the consumer is a BRC.
The firm, instead, maximizes its profits when it faces a BRC with cer-
tainty, because in equilibrium it gets 1 − c(xs). On the contrary, whenever
if it deals with a FRC its profits are 1 − c(xmax), where c(xs) < c(xmax).
Moreover, whenever there is uncertainty about whether the consumer is an
FRC or a BRC, it gets in equilibrium either 1− c(xmax) or 1− c(xs), which
is worse than 1− c(xs).
3.4 Monopolistic Screening
A decision strategy is called compensatory whenever decision-makers make
tradeoffs between attributes. On the other hand, a decision strategy is non-
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compensatory whenever DMs do not (Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993:
29 and 31). A compensatory decision strategies is, for instance, standard
maximization. On the contrary, the satisfycing heuristic is an example a
noncompensatory strategy. In this section a model of monopolistic screening
is illustrated in which two types of consumers act: the first one relies on a
compensatory and the second one on a noncompensatory decision strategy.
Consider the following example. Assume a consumer is interested in buy-
ing a new car. Suppose that she considers only two characteristics, that is,
price and level of emissions (expressed in Light Duty Vehicle European stan-
dards13). The first type of consumer, called FRC, prefers to spend as little
as possible and to own a car that does not pollute that much. Her main fea-
ture is that she makes tradeoffs between attributes. On the other hand, the
second type of consumer is called BRC. Her preferences over attributes are
similar to FRC’s, however, she judges an alternative to be satisfactory only
if the levels of its attributes are at least as good as some threshold. Suppose
that the BRC judges a car to be satisfactory only if it costs at most 15.000
Euros and its standard is at least Euro 3.
Notice that FRC’s and BRC’s preferences may diverge. For instance,
consider car y = (1.000, 1), where the first element represents the attribute
‘price’ and the second ‘emissions’ in terms of the standard ‘Euro x’ with
x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
According to BRC’s preferences, y is not acceptable, because its standard
is less than Euro 3. On the other hand, since FRC’s preferences allow for
compensation, then there exists a car z that is indifferent to y. Suppose that
z = (14.000, 5). Notice that whereas z ∼FRC y, it turns out that z BRC y,
because z is satisfactory.
The goal of this section is to investigate the extent to which the fact that
there are FRCs and BRCs affects the equilibrium outcome of a market in
13In the European Union there are five standards: Euro 1, Euro 2, Euro 3, Euro 4, and
Euro 5. The principle is that the less a car pollutes the highest ‘Euro’ it gets. The cars
that conform to Euro 1 are the ones that pollute more. Currently, Euro 5 is the standard
that certifies the highest level of environmental sustainability.
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which a monopolist supplies a multi-attribute good.
Let X = <0+ × <+ be a subset of the two-dimensional Euclidean space.
Each vector x = (px, qx) ∈ X represents a two-attribute alternative, where
px > 0 represents the attribute ‘price’ and qx ≥ 0 represents a generic at-
tribute different from price.
We assume that there is a monopolist that produces good x whose profit
function is pi(x) = px − c(qx), where c(qx) is the cost of producing good x
with characteristic qx. It is assumed that c(qx) = αqx, where α ∈ (0, 1). The
goal of the monopolist is to maximize profits.
On the demand side, there are two kinds of consumer: the FRC and
the BRC. The FRC is an expected utility maximizer whose Bernoulli utility
function is defined as u(x) = u(g(qx)−px), where the function g measures the
utility of the characteristics qx in monetary units. Let g(qx) = ln(qx+1). This
functional form implies that the FRC evaluates more and more characteristic
qx as it increases, but marginal utility is decreasing. Furthermore, the FRC
is assumed to be risk averse and her reservation utility is u¯, where u¯ > u(0).
The BRC is not a maximizer, but follows the satisficing heuristic. Specif-
ically, she judges a good y ∈ X to be satisfactory only if py ≤ p¯ and qy ≥ q¯,
where (p¯, q¯) ∈ X is a minimal satisfactory alternative.
The goal of the FRC is to maximize her utility and the goal of the BRC
is to get at least a satisfactory product. Throughout this chapter we denote
by x = (px, qx) the product that the monopolist supplies to the FRC and by
y = (py, qy) the product that the monopolist supplies to the BRC.
3.4.1 Certainty About the Consumer’s Type
We assume first that the firm knows that consumers are FRCs. This implies
that the firm maximizes its profits subject to the so called ‘reservation utility
constraint’. That is, the utility of good x must be greater or equal than
the reservation utility. Formally, u(ln(qx + 1) − px) ≥ u¯, or, equivalently,
ln(qx + 1)− px ≥ u−1(u¯). Thus, the firm has to solve the following problem.
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PROBLEM 1
maxpx,qx px − αqx
s.t. (i) ln(qx + 1)− px ≥ u−1(u¯)
The next proposition characterizes the solution of problem 1. Let the
solution be denoted by xc = (pcx, q
c
x), where c stands for certainty.
Proposition 14 Problem 1 has a unique solution xc = (pcx, q
c
x) = (ln(
1
α
) −
u−1(u¯), 1
α
− 1).
Proposition 14 suggests that the FRC gets precisely the reservation utility
under certainty. In fact, plugging the optimal solution into constraint (i), we
get ln( 1
α
− 1 + 1)− ln( 1
α
) + u−1(u¯) ≥ u−1(u¯), which implies that u¯ = u¯.
Suppose now that the firm knows that consumers are BRCs. This implies
that the firm maximizes its profits subject to the constraint that the supplied
product y has to be satisfactory, that is, py ≤ p¯ and qy ≥ q¯. Let these
constraints be called ‘satisficing constraints’. Thus, the firm has to solve the
following problem.
PROBLEM 2
maxpy ,qy py − αqy
s.t. (i) py ≤ p¯
(ii) qy ≥ q¯
The next proposition characterizes the solution of problem 2. Let the
solution be denoted by yc = (pcy, q
c
y), where c stands for certainty.
Proposition 15 Problem 2 has a unique solution yc = (pcy, q
c
y) = (p¯, q¯).
If the consumer is a BRC, then the firm supplies precisely the minimal
satisfactory alternative under certainty. This result confirms what we found
in the quality competition and signalling game models.
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3.4.2 Uncertainty About the Consumer’s Type
Assume now that the firm does not know with certainty whether consumers
are FRCs or BRCs. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that consumers are
FRCs. The firm has to find two goods x = (px, qx) ∈ X and y = (py, qy) ∈ X
such that the expected profit ρ (px − αqx) + (1− ρ) (py − αqy) is maximized,
where x maximizes FRC’s utility and y is at least satisfactory. However,
the optimal solution must satisfy not only the reservation utility and the
satisficing constraints, but also the so called ‘incentive compatible’ ones.
These constraints require that, first, alternative x must yield at least the
same level of utility of good y. Second, good x does not have to be more
than satisfactory, that is, either px ≥ p¯ or qx ≤ q¯ or both. In order to ensure
the second incentive compatible constraint to hold we impose px ≥ p¯. Thus,
the firm has to solve the following problem.
PROBLEM 3
maxpx,py ,qx,qy ρ (px − αqx) + (1− ρ) (py − αqy)
s.t. (i) ln(qx + 1)− px ≥ u−1(u¯)
(ii) py ≤ p¯
(iii) qy ≥ q¯
(iv) ln(qx + 1)− px ≥ ln(qy + 1)− py
(v) px ≥ p¯
The next proposition characterizes the solution of problem 3. Let the
solution be denoted by xu = (pux, q
u
x) and y
u = (puy , q
u
y ), where ‘u’ stands for
uncertainty.
Proposition 16 The solution of Problem 3 is characterized as follows.
1. Assume u¯ ≥ u(p¯, q¯).
(a) if p¯ < pcx, then x
u = (ln
(
1
α
)− u−1(u¯), 1
α
− 1) and yu = (p¯, q¯);
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(b) if p¯ ≥ pcx, then xu = (p¯, ep¯+u−1(u¯) − 1) and yu = (p¯, q¯).
2. Assume u¯ < u(p¯, q¯).
(a) if p¯ < pcx, then x
u = (ln
(
1
α
)− ln(q¯+ 1) + p¯, 1
α
− 1) and yu = (p¯, q¯).
(b) if p¯ ≥ pcx, then xu = (p¯, q¯) and yu = (p¯, q¯).
The solution of problem 3 suggests first that even though the firm is
uncertain about the consumer’s type, once again the BRC gets nothing more
than the minimal satisfactory alternative (p¯, q¯).
Second, the characteristics of the FRC’s good depend on whether the
utility of minimal satisfactory alternative (p¯, q¯) is greater or equal or less
than the reservation utility u¯ and on whether the level of threshold p¯ is
greater or less than, or equal to pcx, the FRC’s optimal price under certainty.
If u¯ ≥ u(p¯, q¯), then the FRC gets precisely the reservation utility. On the
contrary, if u¯ < u(p¯, q¯), then the FRC gets more than u¯.
Third, the characterization of the solution of problem 3 clearly highlights
the compensatory feature of FRC’ preferences. We know that under cer-
tainty the FRC gets xc = (ln
(
1
α
)− u−1(u¯), 1
α
− 1), which yields precisely the
reservation utility u¯. If the FRC follows a compensatory decision strategy,
then it must be the case that if the monopolist supplies a good x whose price
px is greater than p
c
x, then in order to leave the FRC indifferent between x
and xc it must set the quality qx of good x above q
c
x. Consider now the case
in which there is uncertainty and suppose that u¯ > u(y¯) and p¯ > pcx (case
1b of proposition 16). In this case, xu = (p¯, ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1) and yu = (p¯, q¯).
Moreover, notice that the FRC gets precisely the reservation utility, because
ln(qux + 1)− pux = ln(ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1 + 1)− p¯
ln(qux + 1)− pux = u−1(u¯)
u(pux, q
u
x) = u¯
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Since pcx = p¯ and the FRC gets precisely her reservation utility, then the
quality of good x must be greater than qcx, which is the optimal level of quality
for the FRC under certainty. That is, she gets qux = e
p¯+u−1(u¯)−1 > 1
α
−1 = qcx
that compensates her for the higher level of price pux = p¯ > ln(
1
α
)− u−1(u¯) =
pcx. In other words, the FRC moves along the indifference curve that yields
the reservation utility u¯.
Finally, in terms of welfare the firm entirely bears the cost of informa-
tional asymmetries, which increases in the level of the thresholds p¯ and q¯.
On the demand side, the FRC is better off under uncertainty, because if
the thresholds of (p¯, q¯) are particularly high, then she gets more than the
reservation utility u¯. If not, she gets in any case u¯. On the other hand,
uncertainty does not increase BRC’s welfare. The fact that the FRC makes
trade-offs between attributes prevents the BRC from getting something more
than the minimal satisfactory alternative. That is, the compensatory feature
of FRC’ preferences always allows the firm to give the minimum to the BRC
and, combining properly the attributes, an unsatisfactory good that yields
the reservation utility to the FRC. Figure 3.8 illustrates graphically this in-
tuition.
Assume that p¯ > pux and that q¯ > q
c
x, so that both x
c and yc are sat-
isfactory and xc is Pareto-superior to yc. In this case, one expects that
under uncertainty the monopolist makes the BRC better off by supplying
to the FRC and to the BRC two goods xu and yu, respectively, such that
xu = yu = xc. Instead, the optimal solution is xu = (p¯, ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1) and
yu = (p¯, q¯). That is, the monopolist pushes xu towards north-east along the
indifference curve that yields u¯ until it reaches the border of the satisficing
area, so that xu = (p¯, ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1). In this way xu is unsatisfactory and
yields the reservation utility u¯, (p¯, q¯) is not Pareto-dominated by xu, and
the monopolist is free to supply the minimal satisfactory alternative (p¯, q¯)
to the BRC.14 We believe that this is an interesting result, because it pro-
14Technically, xu = (p¯, ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1) is satisfactory and xu is still Pareto-superior to
yu, because pux = p¯. However, since we are on the continuum, we interpret p
u
x = p¯ + ,
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Figure 3.8: Compensatory preferences prevent the BRC from getting some-
thing more than (p¯, q¯)
vides a clear intuition of why in this case uncertainty does not help bounded
rationality.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examines what are the effects of uncertainty on bounded ratio-
nality in a variety of IO models. Results are summarized in the parametric
space of figure 3.9. The x-axis identifies the different models, the y-axis
differentiates between certainty and uncertainty, and the z-axis measures
potential extensions of the proposed models.
where  > 0 is arbitrarily small, so that xu is unsatisfactory.
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Figure 3.9: A parametric space representing BRC’s welfare
Under certainty the BRC gets nothing more than the minimal satisfactory
alternative (min.sat.). This implies that firms prefer to face BRCs rather than
FRCs, because supplying to BRCs increases profits. However, whenever there
is uncertainty about whether consumers are FRCs or BRCs, it is not obvious
a priori whether or not the BRC derives benefits. For example, in the models
of quality competition and signalling, the BRC is better off. In particular,
if the probability that the consumer is an FRC is above some threshold,
then in equilibrium firms supply the optimal product xmax. Interestingly,
we found that in the quality competition model the threshold increases in
the number of firms acting in the market. Our interpretatation is that the
more competitive the market, the higher the probability that the optimal
alternative is not part of the BRC’s consideration set. This implies that
firms are less and less incentivized to supply xmax. Therefore, an higher
threshold is required to induce them to supply an optimal alternative. On
the other hand, in the signalling game the fact that there is a (even small)
probability that the firm faces a FRC rather than a BRC prevents it from
supplying a non-optimal good in order to avoid a punishment (and, therefore,
a drastic reduction of its profits) by the FRC.
In the monopolistic screening model uncertainty does not help BRCs in-
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stead. In particular BRCs get the minimal satisfactory alternative even when
there is uncertainty. The intuition behind this result is that in a multi-
attribute framework the compensatory feature of FRC’s preferences prevents
the BRC from getting something more than the minimal satisfactory alter-
native. Firms give the minimum to the BRC and moving along indifference
curves at least the reservation utility to the FRC.
In the light of these results, we provide some suggestions to policy-makers
aimed at enhancing consumer welfare. First, firms should be induced to be-
lieve that consumers are mainly FRCs. In this way the probability that
all consumers get the optimal alternative is increased. Second, in the long
run FRC’s preferences should be made noncompensatory in order to prevent
firms from giving the minimum to BRCs by moving along FRCs indifference
curves. As an example, advertisement strategies devoted to highlight advan-
tages and disadvantages of products among which consumers are likely to
compensate should be incentivized. In this way, it would be more probable
that rather than perceiving those products as substitutes, consumers rank
them according to a strict preference relation. Third, mechanisms aimed at
facilitating the construction of the consideration set should be developed.
With reference to figure 3.9, further work could be done in various di-
rections. For instance, concerning the x-dimension, the hypothesis that un-
certainty help bounded rationality could be tested on other models, such as
Cournot or von Stackelberg. Moreover, the proposed analysis could be fur-
ther refined by adding more complexity/realism to the models (z-dimension).
For instance, in the quality competition model alternative procedures to form
the consideration set could be investigated.
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Chapter 4
An Experimental Study on the
Satisficing Heuristic
4.1 Introduction
The second chapter of the thesis proposes a theoretical model within the
revealed-preference approach in which DMs behave consistently with the
satisficing heuristic. The third chapter applies this model to more concrete
economic situations, such as markets in which boundedly and fully ratio-
nal consumers interact with firms. This chapter provides an empirical test
aimed at verifying whether subjects behavior is consistent with the satisficing
heuristic.
Standard theory assumes that individuals have infinite computational ca-
pabilities, know all alternatives before deciding, and always select the best
alternative(s) from any choice set. In contrast, Simon (1955) argues that in-
dividuals are boundedly rational. This means that they have bounded com-
putational capabilities, discover and analyze alternatives sequentially, and
often, rather than choosing the optimal alternative, select a satisfactory one.
In addition, he points out that these attitudes depend on the the environment
in which individuals are asked to operate. If the environment is relatively
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complex and new to individuals, then it is likely that they will be content
with alternatives relatively far from the optimum. On the contrary, when
the environment is relatively simple and familiar to them, then presumably
they will choose alternatives relatively closer to the optimum.
In order to test Simon (1955)’s model we propose an experiment in which
subjects are asked to solve five problem sets under time pressure. Each
problem set encompasses 3 choice problems of different complexity. Each
choice problem is an algebraic sum where only the operators and the result
are visible. The spaces between operators and before the ‘equal sign’ are
empty. Subjects are financially incentivized to insert into each algebraic sum
the combination of numbers (from a given set) such that the actual result
of the algebraic sum is as close as possible to the reported result. They are
allowed to change the inserted numbers as many times as they want before
the time expires. Moreover, after an insertion is made, they are informed
about what is the updated actual result of the algebraic sum. We record not
only final choices, but also intermediate ones and decision time.
We investigate the extent to which subjects commit mistakes (i.e., fail
to choose the combination of numbers that maximizes their material pay-
off) and choose sub-optimal alternatives and how allocate decision time and
make intermediate choices. Moreover, we analyze how these variables be-
have relative to the environment in which subjects are asked to operate. In
particular, how they are affected by the extent to which the environment is
complex/simple and familiar/unfamiliar to subjects. We define the variable
complexity as the length of an algebraic sum (the longer the sum, the more
complex the problem) and the variable familiarity of the environment as the
temporal order with which subjects solve problem sets (the first problem set
that subjects face constitutes a less familiar environment with respect to the
second and so on).
We found that in general subjects behavior is consistent with the satis-
ficing heuristic. Data on errors and final choices confirm that subjects are
sensitive to the environment in which they are asked to operate. However,
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complexity seems to have a stronger impact on performance then the variable
familiarity of the environment. Decision time data reveal that an increase in
the complexity of the choice problem does not necessarily cause an increase
in the time spent in trying to solve it. Similarly, for the number of interme-
diate choices. Finally, results provide useful insights for modeling satisficing
behavior. For instance, unlike what several existing models assume (Caplin
and Dean, 2011), we found that the threshold that defines an alternative to
be satisfactory is not fixed, but vary across choice problems.
There is a huge literature on individual decision-making in experimental
economics (Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993; Gigerenzer, Todd and the
ABC Research Group, 1999; Gabaix et al., 2006; Reutskaja et al., 2010).1
However, the closest study to this work is Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009).
As explained in the first chapter, Caplin, Dean and Martin design an exper-
iment aimed at testing whether subjects behavior is consistent with an RBS
model in which search order is not observable (Caplin and Dean, 2011). Each
alternative is an algebraic sum and a choice set is a list of algebraic sums.
Subjects are asked to solve them and choose the one that yields the high-
est payoff, given that there is a one-to-one correspondence between results
and material payoff. Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009) employ the so-called
choice process data, according to which subjects are allowed to change their
choice as many times as they want before the time expires and the amount
of time pressure is random. In addition, at any point in time subjects can
see what alternative they have provisionally chosen. In contrast, we do not
list alternatives and subjects do not see their provisional choice at any point
in time. In this study alternatives are different objects: an alternative is a
combination of numbers that plugged into an algebraic sum yields a certain
result. Once that an inserted number is replaced, the result changes, and,
therefore, the previous choice is not visible anymore. Finally, the amount of
time pressure is not random, but fixed at 75 seconds. We believe that in the
real-world there are both choice problems in which alternatives are listed and
1See also section 1.5.
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choice problems in which alternatives are not. As an example of the former,
think of a Google search. As an example of the latter, imagine a consumer
who looks for a new t-shirt in a marketplace. T-shirts are not listed, but the
consumer walks back and forth around the stalls in order to search for her
most preferred alternative. In view of this difference, we think that these
studies are complementary.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains design and
implementation; Section 4.3 provides a formalization of the kind of choice
problem that subjects are required to solve in this experiment; Section 4.4
formulates hypothesis and shows and discusses the results; Section 4.5 and
section 4.6 examine how performance is affected by the order with which
subjects approach choice problems within a problems set and by individual
features, respectively; Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Design and Implementation
Each subject had to solve five problem sets randomly drawn from a dataset of
15 problem sets. Each problem set was presented in one screen shot as figure
4.1 illustrates. On the left-hand part there was a list of six natural numbers
(in the box numeri che puoi utilizzare) ordered in descending ordered. In
the middle there was a list of three algebraic sums (in the box formule da
risolvere), where only the results (called Goals, written in black) and the
operators were visible. On the right-hand part, for each algebraic sum there
was a number in red in the box risultati parziali, which we call Intermediate
Result. At the bottom there was a box in which the amount of time left to
solve the screen shot was reported both numerically (in seconds) and visually
(the horizontal bar shrank).
Subjects had to insert the numbers available from the box numeri che puoi
utilizzare in the empty spaces between operators of each algebraic sums in
such a way that the actual result of the algebraic sum was as close as possible
to the respective Goal. A number could not be repeated within each algebraic
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Figure 4.1: An Example of a Screen Shot
sum, but could be used more than once across algebraic sums. The three
algebraic sums had different length: one had one operator (a minus), one
had two (a plus and a minus), and one had three (a plus and two minuses).
The order with which algebraic sums of different length appeared to the
subject within each screen shot was random. After a number was inserted
in an algebraic sum, the correspondent Intermediate Result was updated
automatically and showed what was the result of the algebraic sum at that
point in time.
In order to insert a number in a sum, subjects had to click on the number
they wanted to select and an horizontal bar appeared just below the number
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to confirm its selection. Then, they had to click on the position in which
they wanted to insert the number. There was the possibility to replace an
inserted number simply by repeating this procedure. Subjects had 75 seconds
for solving one screen shot.
The show-up fee was 2.00 euros. One round was selected at random for
calculating the payoff performance. They payoff of the selected screen shot
was calculated as follows.
pi ≡ 2.00 + 4
3∑
i=1
dmaxi − dacti
dmaxi
where index i identifies the ith algebraic sum of the selected screen shot,
dmaxi measures the absolute maximal distance between the Goal and the
Intermediate Result of the ith algebraic sum, and dacti measures the absolute
actual distance between the Goal and the Intermediate Result of the ith
algebraic sum when the time expires.
If, when the time expires, the Intermediate result of the ith algebraic sum
is equal to the Goal, then the respective dacti is zero. Therefore,
dmaxi −dacti
dmaxi
=
1. On the contrary, if, when the time expires, the distance between the
Intermediate result and the Goal of the ith algebraic sum is maximal, then
dacti = d
max
i . Therefore,
dmaxi −dacti
dmaxi
= 0. This implies that in general the
ratio
dmaxi −dacti
dmaxi
∈ [0, 1] and the closer the Intermediate Result to the Goal,
the closer the ratio to one, the higher the payoff. Conversely, the further
the Intermediate Result to the Goal, the closer the ratio to zero, the lower
the payoff. Algebraic sums were equally important for the calculation of the
payoff. Since pi = 2.00 + 4
∑3
i=1
dmaxi −dacti
dmaxi
, subjects could earn at most 14
euros and at least 2 euros.
Subjetc were clearly told that only completed algebraic sums (sums with-
out empty spaces between operators) were taken into account for the cal-
culation of the payoff. In order to implement this rule, each dacti associated
with an incomplete algebraic sum was automatically set equal to dmaxi .
Before the experiment subjects were given five minutes to read the in-
structions by themselves. An experimenter then red them loudly. Subse-
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quently, subjects were required to complete a questionnaire aimed at verify-
ing whether or not they understood the instructions. Subjects were allowed
to proceed only if they answered correctly to all questions. Then the ex-
periment started and took on average 8 minutes. After the experiment,
general questions were asked to participants, such as age, sex, etc. Besides
final choices, collected data include intermediate choices, decision time, time
taken to complete the questionnaire, and general information about subjects
(sex, age, etc.).
A total of 60 subjects were recruited and the experiment was conducted
at the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory (University of
Trento). Three sessions of 20 subjects each were implemented on Wednesday,
06 October 2010.
4.3 Choice Problem and Preference
Each algebraic sum of a given screen shot can be viewed as a choice prob-
lem, where, in order to maximize material payoff, the right combination of
numbers has to be inserted into each algebraic sum.
Consider, for instance, the problem of figure 4.1. The set of available
numbers is {1, 9, 11, 16, 24, 26} and the three Goals, as they appear on the
screen shot, are {33, 13, 21}. Consider first the simplest algebraic sum, the
one with 1 operator (the second of figure 4.1). In order to maximize material
payoff one needs to plug into the algebraic sum the ordered pair of numbers
(a, b) ∈ {(x, y)|x, y ∈ {1, 9, 11, 16, 24, 26} and x 6= y} such that a−b = 13. In
principle there are 6!
(6−2)! = 30 ways in which one can complete this sum. The
choice problem under consideration is therefore composed of 30 alternatives.
Since each ordered pair (a, b) is associated with a certain ratio
dmaxi −dacti
dmaxi
, then
we can rank the alternatives according to how much each alternative yields
in terms of payoff, by starting from the best alternative and getting down
progressively to the worst one. In this example the pair (24, 11) is the only
alternative associated with a dact = 0. Indeed, the Goal is equal to 13,
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24 − 11 = 13, and, therefore, the ratio is equal to one. Notice that there is
no pair for which dact = 1. It is easy to see that there are three pairs for
which dact = 2, that is, (16, 1), (24, 9), and (26, 11). The associated ratio is
38−2
38
= 0.95, because dmax = 38. Proceeding in this way, we can construct
a preference relation  defined on {(x, y)|x, y ∈ {1, 9, 11, 16, 24, 26} and x 6=
y} under the assumption that subjects prefer to earn as much as possible:
(24, 11)  (16, 1) ∼ (24, 9) ∼ (26, 11)  . . ..
Similarly, we can get the same kind of information from the other alge-
braic sums (with 2 and 3 operators) of figure 4.1 and from any other screen
shot that has this structure.
The algebraic sums that subjects faced during this experiment are char-
acterized according to table 4.2.
No of Operators Cardinality Prob of  −max
1 30 1
30
2 120 1
60
3 360 1
90
Figure 4.2: Main Characteristics of the Algebraic Sums
A choice problem associated with an algebraic sum with 1, 2, and 3
operators is composed of 30, 6!
(6−3)! = 120, and
6!
(6−4)! = 360 alternatives,
respectively. Moreover, screen shots are designed in such a way that if a
subject inserted numbers at random in the algebraic sums, then the proba-
bilities that she chooses the -maximal alternative would be 1
30
, 1
60
, and 1
90
for algebraic sums with 1, 2 and 3 operators, respectively.
4.4 Hypotheses and Results
4.4.1 Errors
Suppose that a fully rational individual was asked to participate to this
experiment. Because of the full rationality assumption, she would always
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select the -maximal alternative from any choice problem. That is, she
would plug into each algebraic sum the ordered sequence of numbers such
that dact = 0.
However, according to Simon (1955)’s bounded rationality, this should
not be always the case. Subjects do not have infinite computational capa-
bilities and are likely to commit mistakes. Moreover, they do not know all
alternatives before deciding. Rather, they discover and analyze options se-
quentially. The first hypothesis assumes that subjects do not always choose
the alternative that maximizes their material payoff.
Hypothesis 1 Subjects do not choose the -maximal alternative in 100%
of the cases.
In order to test hypothesis 1, we computed the number of times each
subject chose an alternative different from the -maximal one and then we
averaged across subjects. Since each subject solved 15 choice problems (3
algebraic sums for each of the 5 screen shots), then averages are numbers
between 0 and 15. It turns out that on average subjects failed to choose the
optimum 10.7 times, which, in percentage, is the 71.33% of the cases. If one
looks at this measure within each session, results do not change. In session 1
the average number of failures is 11.05 (73.67%), in session 2 is 10.5 (70%),
and in session 3 is 10.55 (70.33%). We can safely conclude that hypothesis 1
is confirmed.
A central part of Simon’ satisficing theory is that individual’s ability to
identify the optimum crucially depends on the environment in which she is
asked to operate. The extent to which the environment is complex and new
to the subject matters.
As a proxy for complexity we use the number of operators in the algebraic
sum. That is, the longer the sum the more complex the environment. We
think that this assumption is reasonable, because at longer algebraic sums
correspond choice problems with greater cardinality and smaller probabilities
of choosing the optimal alternative (see also figure 4.2). What we expect is
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that at more complex choice problems correspond more errors (i.e., number
of choices different from the -maximal).
Hypothesis 2 There are more errors at more complex problems, ceteris
paribus.
We called the algebraic sums with 1, 2, and 3 operators algebraic sums
(or choice problems) of complexity 1 (C1), 2 (C2), and 3 (C3), respectively.
For each level of complexity, we computed the number of times each subject
chose an alternative different from the -maximal and then averaged across
subjects. Since each subject solved 5 choice problems of complexity i, where
i = 1, 2, 3, then averages are numbers between 0 and 5. The average number
of errors for choice problems of complexity 1 is 2.2, of complexity 2 is 4, and
of complexity 3 is 4.5. In percentage, 44%, 80%, and 90%, respectively. We
then compared the average number of errors per subject across complexity by
employing a one-tailed T-test for dependent samples. Results are reported
in figure 4.3.2
Variables Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
C2-C1 1.783 .193 9.229 59 .000
C3-C2 .500 .157 3.189 59 .001
C3-C1 2.283 .175 13.061 59 .000
Figure 4.3: T-test for Dependent Samples - Differences in Average Error Per
Complexity
Differences in the average error are all positive and significant at the 1%
level. Hypothesis 2 is, therefore, confirmed.
Since, according to Simon, not only complexity, but also the extent to
which the environment is new to the subject affects performances, we expect
2We tested H0: the average error at complexity i is equal to the average error at
complexity j, against H1: the average error at complexity i is greater than the average
error at complexity j, where (i, j) ∈ {(2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2)}.
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that the more familiar is the environment, the less number of mistakes sub-
jects commit. As a proxy for familiarity of the environment we employ the
order with which subjects faced screen shots. We believe that it is natural to
assume that the first screen shot that subjects faced constituted for them a
new kind of environment. On the contrary, at the fourth or fifth screen shot,
it seems plausible to assume that subjects learnt and found themselves in a
more familiar situation than at the first or at second one.
Hypothesis 3 Errors decrease with screen shot order, ceteris paribus.
We counted the number of errors each subject committed at the ith screen
shot (Si), with i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and then averaged across subjects. Since each
subject solved 3 problems for each screen shot, then averages are numbers
between 0 and 3. Results are reported in figure 4.4.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
# of Average Errors 2.43 2.18 2.08 1.95 2.05
% of Average Errors 81.11 73.78 69.44 65.00 68.33
Figure 4.4: Average Errors Per Screen shot Order
From figure 4.4 it seems that average errors decrease with screen shot
order until the fourth screen shot and then increases again. A T-test for
dependent samples reveals that only the differences in average error between
S1 and S3, S1 and S4, and S1 and S5 are significant at the 1% level (see
figure 4.5).3 Moreover, the differences in average error between S1 and S2
and S2 and S4 are significant at the 5% level. However, it is important to
note that even though there is an average increase in errors from S4 to S5,
the average error at S5 is still less than the one at S1 and this difference is
significant.
3We tested H0: the average error at screen shot Si is equal to the aver-
age error at the screen shot Sj, against H1: the average error at the screen
shot Si is greater than the average error at the screen shot j, where (i, j) ∈
{(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5)(3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 5)}.
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Variables Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
S1-S2 .250 .118 2.120 59 .019
S1-S3 .350 .108 3.227 59 .001
S2-S3 .100 .125 .799 59 .214
S1-S4 .483 .097 5.007 59 .000
S2-S4 .233 .110 2.124 59 .019
S3-S4 .133 .120 1.112 59 .136
S1-S5 .383 .107 3.598 59 .000
S2-S5 .133 .140 .955 59 .172
S3-S5 .033 .152 .219 59 .414
S4-S5 -.100 .125 -.799 59 .207
Figure 4.5: T-test for Dependent Samples - Differences in Average Error Per
Screen shot Order
An interpretation of this result could be that from the first to the fourth
screen shot subjects learnt and progressively became more and more familiar
with the environment. Consequently, they progressively committed less and
less errors on average. Then, from the fourth screen shot they mastered the
situation, but committed more mistakes because got tired of solving algebraic
sums.
In any case the test seems to suggest that the variable familiarity of the
environment does not have a strong effect on subjects performance. Hence,
we conclude that hypothesis 3 is only partially confirmed.
4.4.2 Choices
Simon (1955) argues that individuals search through the choice set and stop
searching as soon as they identify the first alternative that meets some thresh-
old. The aspiration level that defines an alternative to be satisfactory again
depends on the environment. If the environment is relatively new to subjects
and relatively complex, then the threshold tends to decrease and invididuals
are content with alternatives relatively far from the optimum. On the con-
trary, when the environment is relatively familiar to subjects and relatively
Hypotheses and Results 97
simple, then the threshold tends to appreciate and inviduals are content with
alternatives relatively close to the optimum. Therefore, we expect that at
more complex problems solutions are more sub-optimal. In addition, chosen
alternatives are closer to the optimum at subsequent screen shots.
Hypothesis 4
1. Solutions are more sub-optimal at more complex problems, ceteris paribus.
2. Chosen alternatives are closer to the optimum at subsequent screen
shots, ceteris paribus.
In order to test these hypotheses we first classified alternatives in indiffer-
ence classes according to the above preference relation , where ‘1’ identifies
the first class, ‘2’ the second class, and so on for the remaining classes. In a
given algebraic sum, the first class includes all ordered sequences of numbers
such that the distance between the Intermediate Result and the Goal is zero
when the time expires. In general the ith class contains all sequences such
that, when the time expires, the distance between the Intermediate Result
and the Goal is Di, provided that Dj ≥ Di ≥ Dk, for all j ≥ i ≥ k and
i = 1, . . . , N , where N is the number of indifference classes.
The graph of figure 4.6 shows the distribution of chosen indifference
classes per complexity.4
From the graph it seems that subjects actually chose more sub-optimal
solutions at more complex problems. In order to get confirmation of this
intuition, we calculated for each level of complexity the average chosen indif-
ference class per subject and then performed a T-test (see figure 4.7).5
4Indifference classes are cut at the 18th class because of space needs. However, all visible
distributions include more than the third quartile. Specifically, P (Ind.Class ≤ 18th) =
0.9567 for C1, P (Ind.Class ≤ 18th) = 0.8933 for C2, and P (Ind.Class ≤ 18th) = 0.7967
for C3.
5We tested H0: the average chosen class at complexity i is equal to the average chosen
class at complexity j, against H1: the average chosen class at complexity i is greater than
the average chosen class at complexity j, where (i, j) ∈ {(2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2)}.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of Chosen Indifference Classes Per Complexity
The test reveals that all differences in the average chosen class are positive
and significant at the 1% level. Hence we can conclude that hypothesis 4.1 is
confirmed, that is, solutions are more sub-optimal at more complex problems.
We repeated the same exercise for testing hypothesis 4.2. The graph of
figure 4.8 shows the distribution of chosen indifference classes per screen shot
order.6
From the graph it seems that for the first two or three classes frequencies
increase with screen shot order at least until the second/third screen shot.
For the remaining classes there is not a clear effect and it is difficult to draw
6Indifference classes are cut at the 20th class because of space needs. However, all visible
distributions include more than the third quartile. Specifically, P (Ind.Class ≤ 20th) =
0.7778 for S1, P (Ind.Class ≤ 20th) = 0.8944 for S2, P (Ind.Class ≤ 20th) = 0.9056 for
S3, P (Ind.Class ≤ 20th) = 0.9333 for S4, and P (Ind.Class ≤ 20th) = 0.9611 for S5.
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Variables Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
C2-C1 3.3067 .5840 5.662 59 .000
C3-C2 5.2933 1.0916 4.849 59 .000
C3-C1 8.6000 1.2452 6.906 59 .000
Figure 4.7: T-test for Dependent Samples - Differences in Average Chosen
Class Per Complexity
any kind of conclusion.
In order to shed light on this this relationship, we calculated the average
chosen indifference class per subject for each screen shot and then performed
a T-test (see figure 4.9).7
What we can infer from the test is that the average chosen class decreases
with screen shot order, because mean differences are all positive (second col-
umn of figure 4.9). This implies that subjects got progressively closer to the
optimum. However, only the differences in average chosen class between S1
and all the other screen shots, between S2 and S5, and between S3 and S5
are significant at the 1% level. The differences between S2 and S4 and S4 and
S5 are significant at the 10% level. This implies that subject actually im-
proved their performances over time, but this effect is not strong. Therefore,
hypothesis 4.2 cannot be fully confirmed.
The results of this subsection suggest that subjects’ behavior appear to be
consistent with the satisficing heuristic. Moreover, it seems that complexity
has a stronger impact on average performance than the variable familiarity
of the environment.
7We tested H0: the average chosen class at screen shot Si is equal to the aver-
age chosen class at the screen shot Sj, against H1: the average chosen class at the
screen shot Si is greater than the average chosen class at the screen shot j, where
(i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5)(3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 5)}.
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of Chosen Indifference Classes Per Screen Shot Order
4.4.3 Decision Time
Subjetc had 75 seconds for solving each screen shot. They were free to
allocate the amount of available time among algebraic sums as they wanted.
What we expect is that subjects spend more time on more complex problems
than on simpler ones. This is also consistent with the bounded rationality
assumption: subjects do not have infinite computational capabilities and,
therefore, handle simple problems in relatively little time and concentrate
most in solving more complex problems.
Hypothesis 5 Decision time increases with complexity.
We computed the average amount of time (in milliseconds) each subject
spent on algebraic sums of different complexity and then averaged across
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Variables Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
S1-S2 4.989 1.0480 4.761 59 .000
S1-S3 5.2278 1.047 4.991 59 .000
S2-S3 .2389 .9625 .2480 59 .402
S1-S4 6.3000 1.2130 5.193 59 .000
S2-S4 1.3110 .8880 1.4770 59 .072
S3-S4 1.0722 .8787 1.2200 59 .114
S1-S5 7.4500 1.082 6.887 59 .000
S2-S5 2.4610 .7680 3.204 59 .001
S3-S5 2.2222 .7874 2.8220 59 .003
S4-S5 1.150 .8690 1.3230 59 .095
Figure 4.9: T-test for Dependent Samples - Differences in Average Chosen
Class per Screen shot Order
subjects. Let DT1, DT2, and DT3 denote the amount of time spent on alge-
braic sums of complexity 1, 2, and 3, respectively. On average subjects spent
16,281.97ms, 24,237.46ms, and 26,400.65ms on algebraic sums of complex-
ity 1, 2, and 3, respectively. We then performed a T-test in order to check
whether these differences are significant or not (see figure 4.10).8
Variables Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
DT2-DT1 7.95549E3 1.11612E3 7.128 59 .000
DT3-DT2 2.16318E3 1.55605E3 1.390 59 .085
DT3-DT1 1.01187E4 1.27629E3 7.928 59 .000
Figure 4.10: T-test for Dependent Samples - Differences in Average Decison
Time Per Complexity
What emerges from the test is that subject clearly spent more time on
algebraic sums of complexity 2 and 3 than on sums of complexity 1. In fact
8We tested H0: the average amount of time spent on sums of complexity i is equal
to the average amount of time spent on sums of complexity j, against H1: the average
amount of time spent on sums of complexity i is greater than the average amount of time
spent on sums of complexity j, where (i, j) ∈ {(2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2)}.
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mean differences (DT2-DT1 and DT3 - DT1) are positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. However, even though on average subjects spent
more time on algebraic sums of complexity 3 than on sums of complexity
2, this difference is significant only at the 10% level. An interpretation of
this result might be that whereas subjects clearly found algebraic sums of
complexity 2 and 3 more demanding than algebraic sums of complexity 1,
they did not have the same feeling about sums of complexity 2 and 3. Even
though subjects spent on average more time on the most complex sums, it
seems that sums of higher complexity (C2 and C3) were perceived almost as
equally demanding. Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that hypothesis 5
is confirmed.
4.4.4 Clicks
Subjects were told in the instructions that only completed algebraic sums
(sums without empty spaces between operators) are taken into account for
calculating the payoff. Clearly, in order to complete a sum of complexity 1
two insertions are necessary: one for the first and one for the second number.
Similarly, for completing an algebraic sum of complexity 2 and 3 at least 3
and 4 inputs are needed, respectively. However, subjects were free to change
the inserted numbers as many times as they wanted before the time expired.
We believe that it is interesting to investigate the extent to which subjects
exploited this opportunity.
We call click the action by which a number is inserted into an algebraic
sum. We can interpret a click as an intermediate decision, because after
a number is inserted in an algebraic sum, the correspondent Intermediate
Result gets updated and by looking at it subjects can easily figure out how
far they are from the Goal. As we have just seen, the minimum number
of clicks for completing an algebraic sum of complexity 1 is 2, for a sum
of complexity 2 is 3, and for a sum of complexity 3 is 4. We first checked
whether subjects made extra clicks, i.e. more clicks than the minimum for
each level of complexity.
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Hypothesis 6 Subjects made extra clicks.
We computed the average number of extra clicks each subject made for
every level of complexity and checked whether these averages are significantly
greater than zero by employing a one-sample T-test (see figure 4.11).9 Let
EC1, EC2, and EC3 denote the average number of extra clicks at complexity
1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Variable Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
EC1 1.025 9.068 59 .000
EC2 2.1844 9.189 59 .000
EC3 1.9106 10.125 59 .000
Figure 4.11: One-sample T-test - Average Number of Extra Clicks per Com-
plexity
Mean differences are all positive and significant at the 1% level. This
means that subject actually made extra clicks indipendently of the complex-
ity of the problem.
According to Simon (1955), subjects do not know all alternatives in the
choice set before deciding, but discover and analyze them sequentially. If at
relatively simple problems, individuals easily figure out how the choice set
looks like, at more complex one, they have difficulties. He argues that, for
this reason, they employ a trials and errors kind of search procedure. Hence,
we expect that extra clicks, if any, should increase with complexity, because,
at more complex problems should correspond more trials to get close to the
optimum.
Hypothesis 7 Extra clicks increase with complexity.
We used the average number of extra clicks each subject made for every
level of complexity for performing a T-test (see figure 4.12).10
9We tested H0: the average number of extra clicks at complexity i is equal zero,
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Variables Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
EC2-EC1 1.1594 .2023 5.731 59 .000
EC3-EC2 -.2739 .2857 -.959 59 .171
EC3-EC1 .8856 .2209 4.009 59 .000
Figure 4.12: T-test for Dependent Samples - Differences in Average Number
of Extra Clicks Per Complexity
From figure 4.12 we can infer that subjects made on average significantly
more extra clicks at problems of complexity 2 and 3 than at problems of
complexity 1. However, subjects made more extra clicks at problems of com-
plexity 2 than at problems of complexity 3. Even though the difference in
not significant, this result is surprising. An explanation could be that sub-
jects judged choice problems of complexity 3 as too difficult and preferred on
average to draw their attention to simpler problems. Alternatively, subjects
may have judged problems of complexity 2 and 3 almost equally demanding
and decided to focus more on problems of complexity 2 because there were
more chances of getting close to the optimum. The second explanation would
also be consistent with the results of hypothesis 5.
4.5 Order
Each screen shot contained a list of three algebraic sums of different com-
plexity randomly ordered. The order with which sums had to be solved was
completely up to subjects discretion. In this section we investigate the way
in which subjects decided to approach this issue.
Following Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009), we identified five strate-
against H1: the average number of extra clicks at complexity i is is greater than zero,
where i = 1, 2, 3.
10We tested H0: the average number of extra clicks at complexity i is equal to the
average number of extra clicks at complexity j, against H1: the average number of extra
clicks at complexity i is greater than the average number of extra clicks at complexity j,
where (i, j) ∈ {(2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2)}.
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gies: Top-Bottom (TB), Bottom-Top (BT), Simple-Complex (SC), Complex-
Simplex (CS), and Uncategorized (U). The TB (BT) strategy implies that
subject solve algebraic sums from the top (bottom) to the bottom (top) of the
screen shot. The SC (CS) strategy, instead, implies that subjects solve sums
from the simplest (more complex) to the more complex (simplest). That is,
first sums of complexity 1 (3), then of complexity 2 (2), and finally of com-
plexity 3 (1). The U strategy encompasses any strategy that does not fall in
any of the previous categories.
We then categorized played screen shots according to these strategies.
Notice that TBs and SCs kind of strategies are not mutually exclusive. For
this reason we identified also the intersections. Moreover, since each of the
60 subjects went over 5 screen shots, then we collected 300 observations (1
for each played screen shot). Results are summarized in figure 4.13.
Strategy # %
TB 132 44.00
BT 38 12.67
SC 120 40.00
CS 13 4.33
TB∩SC 39 13.00
TB∩CS 10 3.33
BT∩SC 22 7.33
BT∩CS 0 0
U 68 22.67
Total 300 100.00
Figure 4.13: Frequencies of Chosen Strategies (TB, BT, SC, CS, U) and
Intersections
The results suggest that the most frequent strategy is the TB one, followed
by the SC one. Intersections seem to reveal that strategies BT and CS were
chosen only when they coincided with strategies SC and TB, respectively.
Only the 22.67% of the observations were not classifiable.
We also investigated how the choice of a particular strategy affected the
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performance. We concentrated only on strategies TB, SC, and U, because
these were the most frequently used. This analysis turned out to be compli-
cated because subjects were allowed to switch from one strategy to another
one across the five screen shots. For this reason we proceeded in the following
way. We first averaged chosen indifference classes within each screen shot, so
that for each observation (played screen shot) we had a measure of perfor-
mance. Then, we categorized played screen shots according ‘pure’ strategies.
That is, once that we classified the screen shots according to TB, SC, or U,
we eliminated all played screen shots that were consistent with more than
one strategy. Subsequently, for every pair of strategies, we created two sub-
groups of screen shots. One group, called dependent, contained screen shots
played by subjects who used both strategies. That is, for each subject we
had two observations: one screen shot played with one strategy and another
screen shot played with the other strategy. The second group, called inde-
pendent, contained screen shots played by subjects who used either one or
the other strategy. Figure 4.14 reports the number of observations per group
for every pair of strategies.
Pairs U vs SC U vs TB SC vs TB
Strat. U SC U TB SC TB
Dep. 19 19 26 26 16 16
Indep. 22 12 15 14 15 24
Figure 4.14: No. of Observations per Group for Each Pair of Strategies
Our goal was to check, for every pair of strategies, whether the use of
one strategy yields on average more material payoff than the use of another
strategy. We performed, for each pair of strategies, a T-test for dependent
samples for the observations that belong to the dependent group (figure 4.15)
and a t-test for independent samples for the observations that belong to the
independent group (figure 4.16).11
11In both t-test we tested H0: the average chosen class at screen shots played according
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Variables Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
U-SC 2.294 1.551 1.479 18 .076
U-TB 3.564 1.551 2.298 25 .015
SC-TB 1.500 .716 2.095 15 .027
Figure 4.15: T-test for Dependent Samples - Differences in Average Chosen
Class Per Strategy (Dependent Group)
The first test reveals that all differences are positive and significant (U-
SC at the 10% and U-TB and SC-TB at 5% level). This implies that the
strategy that yielded on average the greatest payoff is TB, followed by SC.
The worst strategy is U. This result is not surprising, because we think that
in general subjects who behaves according to U do not approach screen shots
in a systematic and organized way and, therefore, it seems reasonable to
expect them to perform worse than those who use TB or SC.
Eq. Variance T-test for Equality of Means
Pair F Sig. Mean Diff. St.Err.Mean Diff. t-stat. Df Sig.(1-tailed)
U-SC (Eq.Var.) 15.797 .000 3.849 1.879 2.048 32 .025
U-SC (¬Eq. Var.) 3.849 1.394 2.762 22.327 .006
U-TB (Eq.Var.) 13.671 .001 2.932 1.619 1.811 27 .041
U-TB (¬Eq.Var.) 2.932 1.564 1.875 14.454 .041
SC-TB (Eq.Var.) .354 .555 -.562 1.121 -.501 37 .310
SC-TB (¬Eq.Var.) -.562 .976 -.576 35.940 .284
Figure 4.16: T-test for Independent Samples - Differences in Average Chosen
Class Per Strategy (Independent Group)
The results of figure 4.16 only partially confirm the findings of the test for
dependent samples. The t-test for independent samples suggests that we can
reject the null hypothesis that the variables average chosen class at U and
to strategy i is equal to the average chosen class at screen shots played according to strategy
j, against H1: the average chosen class at screen shots played according to strategy i is
greater than the average chosen class at screen shots played according to strategy j, where
(i, j) ∈ {(U, SC), (U, TB), (SC, TB)}. The T-test for independent samples includes also a
Levene’s test for equality of variances.
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at SC have equal variance at the 1% significance level. Similarly, we cannot
at U and at TB. Differences in means (second and fourth row of figure 4.16)
are positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
This means that SC and TB are again revealed to be superior to U. On
the other hand, looking at the pair (SC,TB) we first notice that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the variables average chosen class at SC and
at TB have equal variance. Moreover, though not significant, the difference
in means is negative (sixth row of figure 4.16). That is, SC seems to perform
better than TB. This partially contradicts our previous findings.
4.6 Individual Features
Collected data include general information about subjects, such as age, sex,
and time taken to solve the questionnaire. In this section we investigate
whether these individual features affect the performance.
We set as dependent variable the subject average chosen class. Indepen-
dent variables were sex, age, time taken to solve the questionnaire, number
of experiments to which the subject participated in 2010, and enrollment
year.12 We run an ordered probit (see figure 4.17).13
Results suggest only the estimates of the variables time taken to solve
the questionnaire and age are significant at 1% and 10% level, respectively.
Since the estimate for time taken to solve the questionnaire is very close to
zero, but positive, then this implies that the more time subjects spent on the
questionnaire, the worse they performed. This is an intuitive result, because
the variable time taken to solve the questionnaire appears to be a good proxy
for subjects intelligence. The estimate of the variable age is also positive.
This implies that relatively older subjects preformed worse.
12Sex is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the subject is a male. Enrollment year is
defined as follows: 1 = first-year student, 2 = second-year student, 3 = third-year student,
4 = Postgraduate Student, 5 = out-of-course student, and 6 = graduate who works.
13In order to reduce the number of thresholds, we approximated the dependent variable
to the closest inferior integer.
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Estimate St. Error Wald Df Sig.
Class= 2 1.777 1.155 2.368 1 .124
Class= 3 2.914 1.157 6.347 1 .012
Class= 4 3.531 1.168 9.136 1 .003
Class= 5 3.852 1.176 10.724 1 .001
Class= 6 3.976 1.180 11.361 1 .001
Class= 7 4.089 1.183 11.947 1 .001
Class= 8 4.458 1.195 13.907 1 .000
Class= 9 4.662 1.203 15.020 1 .000
Class= 11 5.044 1.220 17.106 1 .000
Class= 12 5.315 1.233 18.582 1 .000
Class= 13 5.527 1.245 19.719 1 .000
Class= 14 5.959 1.274 21.896 1 .000
Class= 16 6.162 1.290 22.829 1 .000
Class= 18 6.431 1.316 23.895 1 .000
Class= 21 6.813 1.366 24.866 1 .000
Sex -.162 .298 .296 1 .587
Age .110 .061 3.257 1 .071
Time Quest. 5.934E-6 1.101E-6 29.070 1 .000
No. Exp. .060 .046 1.693 1 .193
En. Year -.243 .162 2.258 1 .133
Figure 4.17: Ordered Probit of Subjetc Average Chosen Class on Sex, Age,
Time Quest., No.Exp., and En. Year
Having said that, a reason for which the regressors do not explain much
of the dependent variable might be that each observation of the dependent
variable is an average of 15 choices (each subject faced 3 algebraic sums for
each of the 5 screen shots). Hence, a lot of variability of the data is absorbed
by and hidden behind the average. This might have prevented the dependent
variables from exerting their explanatory power.
110 An Experiment on the Satisficing Heuristic
4.7 Concluding Remarks
We run an experiment to test whether subjects behavior is consistent with
the Simon (1955)’ satificing heuristic.
We found that often subjects fail to choose the alternative that yields the
maximum payoff, revealing that they have limited computational capabili-
ties and that their behavior is not consistent with the standard assumption.
The analysis of choice data clearly suggests subjects massively selected sub-
optimal solutions. The average performance is negatively affected by the
complexity of the environment and, even though the effect is not strong,
increases as subjects become more familiar with the environment. Decision
time and extra-clicks data confirm these findings. However, it seems that an
increase in complexity does not necessarily cause an increase in decision time
and extra-clicks. A decisive increase occurs only when complexity increases
from its lowest level (1) to higher levels (2 and 3). However, among prob-
lems of higher complexity there is not a clear effect. This may be due to the
fact that either subjects do not perceive complexity as it actually is or they
do, but prefer to concentrate their attention on relatively simpler problems
(of complexity 2) because there are more chances of reaching the optimum.
Further investigation would be needed to disentangle this issue. Concerning
the order with which subjects solve problems, the most frequent strategies
are Top-Bottom and Simple-Complex, which are also the ones that guaran-
tee the highest payoff. We conclude that in general this evidence supports
Simon’s idea of bounded rationality.
The results provide also some useful insights for modeling satisficing be-
havior. For instance, both Caplin and Dean (2011) and the model proposed
in the second chapter of this thesis assume that the threshold that defines an
alternative to be satisfactory is fixed. However, this evidence suggests that
the threshold varies across problems and crucially depends on complexity
and, to a lesser degree, on the extent to which the environment is familiar
to subjects. A nice exercise would be to extend these models in order to
account for this possibility.
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Since collected data include also intermediate choice, it would be inter-
esting to analyze the path that led subjects to their final choice. In Caplin,
Dean and Martin (2009) the alternatives that constitute a choice set are
listed and visible. According to choice process data, subjects are allowed to
change the chosen alternative as many times as they want before the time
expires. Caplin, Dean and Martin find that subjects decide to switch only
when a superior alternative is identified and chosen. That is, subjects always
choose the best alternative in the consideration set. However, this may be
due to the fact that in their experiment search history is partially visible
(the provisional choice at any point in time). We expect that in a context,
such as in this experiment, in which alternatives are not listed and search
history is not visible, subjects do not behave in the same way. Rather, we
expect that, especially at more complex problems, subjects end up choosing
a non-optimal alternative in the consideration set. There are two reasons
behind this intuition. First, subjects might not remember how to reach the
superior alternative. Second, subject might fail to choose the superior alter-
native because they are not able to figure out what is the path that leads
to it. An analysis of intermediate choices could shed light on how subjects
explored the choice set and in particular on this issue.
Finally, a notable amount of experiments has been run within ‘natu-
ral’ environments, such as marketplaces (see Harrison and List (2004) for a
survey and Palacios-Huerta and Volj (2009) and Apesteguia and Palacios-
Huerta (2010) as more recent studies). It would be interesting to investigate
whether subjects still exhibit satisficing attitudes also outside the laboratory
by running a field experiment.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis we investigate what are the effects of assuming economic agents
to be boundedly rational on various fields of microeconomics. In particular we
define a boundedly rational DM as an individual who follows the satisficing
heuristic proposed by Simon (1955; 1956). We first propose a theory of
boundedly rational choice within the revealed preference approach. Then,
we investigate whether the fact that there is uncertainty about consumers’
rationality enhances their welfare in several markets. Finally, we propose
an experiment aimed at testing the extent to which subjects’ behavior is
consistent with the satisficing heuristic.
The next section highlights what is our contribution relative to the exist-
ing literature and discusses limitation of the present work and possible future
developments.
Contribution Relative to the Existing Litera-
ture and Future Work
Our major contribution to choice theory is to provide a formalization of
the satisficing heuristic within the revealed preference approach that differs
from the existing studies (Rubinstein and Salant, 2006; Caplin and Dean,
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2011). On the one hand, Rubinstein and Salant (2006) propose a model in
which DMs analyze alternatives sequentially. We generalize their framework
by assuming that DMs do not necessarily examine alternatives one by one.
On the other hand, unlike Caplin and Dean (2011) we do not make use
of choice process data, but we consider only final choices. Moreover, we
perform a rich and complete analysis by axiomatically characterizing our
procedure and providing behavioral definitions of satisfaction, attention, and
preference under three different domains. This study could be improved in
two ways. First, the relationships between our model and Rubinstein and
Salant (2006) could be further investigated. A nice exercise would be to
extend their results to menu sequences. Second, the experiment proposed
in the fourth chapter highlights the fact that the threshold that defines an
alternative to be satisfactory vary across choice problems. In particular it
is strongly influenced by complexity. It would be interesting to extend our
model by allowing the threshold to vary depending on the extent to which
the choice problem under consideration is more or less complex. This would
make the model more realistic.
The third chapter investigates what is the impact of uncertainty about
consumers’ rationality on their welfare in a variety of markets. An extensive
body of literature has been developed in analyzing the effects of bounded ra-
tionality on industrial organization (Spiegler, 2011) that suggests that bound-
edly rational individuals are typically subject to exploitation. We show that
it is not obvious a priori whether uncertainty enhances consumers’ welfare.
In particular it depends on the assumptions that we make on the market
model. For instance, in the quality-competition model uncertainty increases
boundedly rational consumers’ welfare. On the contrary, in the monopolis-
tic screening model this does not happen. None of the existing studies of
which we are aware assume consumers to behave according to the satisficing
heuristic. In addition, the analysis of the results allows us to derive some
suggestions for policy-makers. On the other hand, the major weakness of
this study is that it provides a simple and preliminary analysis. It could be
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improved both by adding more complexity and realism to the model and by
investigating other markets than those analyzed in the present work.
In the fourth chapter we propose an experiment aimed at testing the
extent to which subjects’ behavior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic.
We show that in general subjects behavior is consistent with it and that
complexity has a stronger impact on subjects’ performance than the variable
familiarity of the environment. In addition we derive some useful insights
for modeling satisficing behavior, such as the one mentioned above. The
closest study to our work is Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009). We depart
from it for several reasons. First, we ask subjects to perform a different
task. Second, unlike Caplin, Dean and Martin (2009), we do not use choice
process data, but other data enrichment techniques, such as intermediate
choices and decision time. Third, our design does not allow subjects to
monitor part of the search history. This study could be improved by further
analyzing intermediate choices. This would allow us to figure out what was
the path that led subjects to their final choice and to shed further light on the
decision-making process. Moreover, it would be interesting to verify whether
also outside the laboratory subjects exhibit satisficing attitudes by running
a field experiment.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Independence of the Axioms
WARP does not imply MI. Let X = {x, y, z}. {x} = C({x, y, z}),
{x} = C({x, y}), {x} = C({x, z}), and {y, z} = C({y, z}). This choice
correspondence satisfies WARP, but violates MI.
MI does not imply WARP. Let X = {x, y, z}. {x} = C({x, y, z}),
{y} = C({x, y}), {x} = C({x, z}), and {y} = C({y, z}). This choice corre-
spondence satisfies MI, but violates WARP.
A.2 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that c is an SCF.
Assume that x ∈ UC(X;xs). Suppose, by contradiction, that there ex-
ists a (B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that x ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 . Then there are two cases. As-
sume first that c(B, {Bj}) ∈ UC(X;xs). In this case, Γ(B,{Bj}) = Bj. How-
ever, since x ∈ UC(X;xs) ∩Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 , then j > min{j|Bj ∩ UC(X;xs) 6=
∅}, which leads to a contradiction. Next, assume that c(B, {Bj}) /∈ UC(X;xs).
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In this case Γ(B,{Bj}) = B and {c(B, {Bj})} = max(B;). However, since
x ∈ UC(X;xs), then x  c(B, {Bj}), which leads to a contradiction.
Conversely, assume that x /∈ UC(X;xs). We want to show that there
exists some (B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that x ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 . Let {y} = max(X;).
Take any (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 such that y ∈ Aj \Ak with k < j and x ∈ Ak. Since
xs ∈ X, then necessarily y ∈ UC(X;xs). This implies that y = c(A, {Aj}),
which is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that c is an SCF.
Suppose first that y = c(A, {Aj}) and x ∈ Ac(A,{Aj})m . Independently
of whether UC(A;xs) 6= ∅ or not, x ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}). Next, assume that y =
c(A, {Aj}) and there exists a (B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that y ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 . By
Proposition 1, y is unsatisfactory. Therefore, Γ(A,{Aj}) = A. Since x ∈ A,
then x ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}).
Conversely, assume that x ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}). Assume first that UC(A;xs) 6= ∅.
In this case c(A, {Aj}) ∈ UC(A;xs). Since Γ(A,{Aj}) = Aj, where j =
min{j|Aj ∩ UC(A;xs) 6= ∅}, then x ∈ Ac(A,{Aj})m , which means that x at-
tracts attention at (A, {Aj}). Next, assume that UC(A;xs) = ∅. By Propo-
sition 1, c(A, {Aj}) is unsatisfactory. If this is the case, then there exists a
(B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that x ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 , which is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that c is an SCF.
Assume first that x  y. Take a (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 such that A = {x, y} =
A1. Since A1 = A, then necessarily x and y attract attention at (A, {Aj})
and Γ(A, {Aj}) = A. Since c(A, {Aj}) = max(A;), then x = c(A, {Aj}),
as desired.
Conversely, assume that there is some (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 such that x =
c(A, {Aj}) and y attracts attention at (A, {Aj}). By Proposition 2, y ∈
Γ(A,{Aj}). Since {c(A, {Aj})} = max(Γ(A,{Aj});), then x  y, which is the
desired result.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that c is an SCF2.
Assume that x ∈ UC(X;xs). Suppose, by contradiction, that there
exists a (B,B1) ∈ D2 such that x ∈ B1 and c(B,B1) /∈ B1. Then there are
two cases. Assume first that c(B,B1) ∈ UC(B;xs). In this case, Γ(B,B1) =
B¯ ⊃ B1. However, since x ∈ UC(X;xs) ∩ B1, then it is not true that
UC(B \ B1;xs) 6= ∅, which leads to a contradiction. Next, assume that
c(B, {Bj}) /∈ UC(X;xs). In this case Γ(B,B1) = B and {c(B, {Bj})} =
max(B;). However, since x ∈ UC(X;xs), then x  c(B,B1), which leads
to a contradiction.
Conversely, assume that x /∈ UC(X;xs). We want to show that there
exists some (B,B1) ∈ D2 such that x ∈ B1 and c(B,B1) /∈ B1. Let {y} =
max(X;). Take any (A,A1) ∈ D2 such that y ∈ A \ A1 and x ∈ A1. Since
xs ∈ X, then necessarily y ∈ UC(X;xs). This implies that y = c(A, {Aj}),
which is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that c is an SCF2.
Assume first that x  y. Take a (A,A1) ∈ D2 such that A = {x, y} = A1.
Notice that necessarily A1 = A = Γ(A,A1). Since c(A,A1) = max(A;),
then x = c(A,A1), as desired.
Conversely, assume that there is some (A,A1) ∈ D2 such that x =
c(A,A1) and y ∈ A1. Since y ∈ Γ(A,A1) and {c(A,A1)} = max(Γ(A,A1);),
then x  y, which is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that c is an SCF2.
If x ∈ A1 ∨ x = c(A,A1), then obviously x ∈ Γ(A,A1). Next, assume
that y = c(A,A1) and there exists a (B,B1) ∈ D2 such that y ∈ B1 and
c(B,B1) /∈ B1. By Proposition 4, y is revealed to be unsatisfactory. Hence,
Γ(A,A1) = A. This implies that x ∈ Γ(A,A1), which is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that c is an SCC.
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Assume that x ∈ UC(X;xs). Since x is satisfactory, then for any A ∈
P(X) such that x ∈ A there exist a {Aj} ∈ A for which x = c(A, {Aj}).
This implies that x = c(X, {Xj}) for some {Xj} ∈ X . Since x ∈ X, then
there exists a sequence Since xs ∈ X, then there exists an (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1
such that x = c(A, {Aj}). This implies that x ∈ C(X).
Conversely, assume that x ∈ C(X). Suppose, by contradiction, that
x ∈ UC(X;xs). This implies that x = c(X, {Xj}) for all {Xj} ∈ X and
{x} = C(X). However, since xs ∈ X, then there are some {Xj} ∈ X such
that xs = c(X, {Xj}). In this case C(X) is not a singleton, which leads to a
contradiction. Hence, x ∈ UC(X;xs), as desired.
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that c is an SCC.
Assume first that x ¬S y. Since x is unsatisfactory, then there is some
B ∈ P(X) such that xs ∈ B. In this case, x 6= c(B, {Bj}) for all {Bj} ∈ B,
which implies that x /∈ C(B). Next, since x and y are unsatisfactory, then
there exists some A ∈ P(X) such that x, y ∈ A and x = c(A, {Aj}) for all
{Aj} ∈ A. Hence, {x} = C(A), as desired.
Conversely, assume that there is some A ∈ P(X) such that {x} = C(A)
and y ∈ A and some B ∈ P(X) such that x /∈ C(B). Since x /∈ C(B), then
this implies that x is unsatisfactory. Next, since there is some A ∈ P(X)
such that {x} = C(A), then also y is unsatisfactory. In addition, this implies
that x ¬S y.
Proof of Proposition 9. Necessity. Assume that C(A) =
⋃
{Aj}∈A c(A, {Aj}),
where c(A, {Aj}) is an SCF. We can rewrite C as:
C(A) = max(A;R)
where R is a weak order on X and the indifference classes apart from the
maximal one are singletons.
It is immediate to see that C satisfies WARP. Moreover, since all indif-
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ference classes different from the maximal one are singletons, then also MI is
satisfied.
Sufficiency. Assume that C satisfies WARP and MI. We have to show
that there exist a weak order on X such that C(A) = max(A;R) and all
indifference classes apart from the maximal one are singletons.
It is well-known that if C satisfies WARP, then there exist a weak order
R such that C(A) = max(A;R) for any A ∈ P(X). Next, suppose, by
contradiction, that x, y ∈ C(A) and there is some B ∈ P(X) such that x ∈ B
and x /∈ C(B), so that x is not R-maximal in X. However, this immediately
contradicts MI. Hence, there exist no such B and all indifference classes apart
from the maximal one are singletons, which is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 10. It is immediate to prove existence. Assume
that firms play xmax = (xmaxi )i∈N . In this case firm i’s profits are
1
n
−c(xmax).
We show that there are not profitable deviations. Suppose that firm i deviates
by playing any x′ such that xmax  x′. This implies that its profits are −c(x′)
and the deviation is not profitable.
Now we prove uniqueness. We first show that any equilibrium has to be
symmetric and than that any symmetric strategy profile different from xmax
is not an equilibrium.
Assume that firms play x, where xi  xj for some i ∈ N and for all
j 6= i, so that x is not symmetric. Since the FRC always compares the
products that firms produce in advance, then pii(x) =
1
n(i,x)
− c(xi) for all
i and pij(x) = −c(xj) for all j 6= i. Each firm j can profitably deviate
by supplying an alternative of the same quality as firm i’s. Therefore, a
necessary condition for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium is that it has
to be symmetric.
Finally, suppose, by contradiction, that there is another symmetric Nash
equilibrium x′ different from xmax. Firm i’s profits are 1
n
−c(x′). Assume that
one firm deviates by playing x′′, where x′′  x′. The firm that deviates gets
a profit equal to 1− c(x′′). We have to show that 1− c(x′′) > 1
n
− c(x′). Since
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sup{c(x)|x ∈ X} = 1
n
and c(x′′) > c(x′), then we can rewrite the previous
inequality as 1− 1
n
> 1
n
−c(x′), which implies that n−2
n
> −c(x′). Since n ≥ 2,
then the deviation is profitable, but this leads to a contradiction. Therefore,
xmax is unique.
Proof of Proposition 11. We first prove existence. Suppose that firms
play xs = (xsi )i∈N . In this case firm i’s expected payoff is pii(x
s) = 1
n
(1 −
c(xs))− n−1
n
c(xs) = 1
n
− c(xs).
Suppose by contradiction that xs is not a Nash equilibrium. If this is the
case, then there must be at least one profitable deviation.
Assume first that firm i deviates, by playing some pure strategy x′, where
xs  x′. In this case, firm i’s expected payoff is equal to pii(x′i, xs−i) = −c(x′),
which means that the deviation is not profitable.
Next, suppose that firm i deviates, by playing some pure strategy x′′,
where x′′  xs. In this case, firm i’s expected payoff is equal to pii(x′′i , xs−i) =
1
n
(1 − c(x′′)) − n−1
n
c(x′′) = 1
n
− c(x′′). Since x′′  xs, then c(x′′) > c(xs).
Hence, the deviation is not profitable.
Since there are no profitable deviations, then a contradiction takes place
and xs is a Nash equilibrium.
Now we prove uniqueness. As in proof of Proposition 10 any equilib-
rium has to be symmetric. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is another
symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x∗ = (x∗i )i∈N different from x
s.
Assume that firms play x∗. Hence, each firm i’s profit is 1
n
− c(x∗). Suppose
first that xs  x∗. Applying the reasoning of the proof of Proposition 10
we conclude that x∗ cannot a Nash equilibrium, because each firm i could
profitably deviate by playing x∗∗  x∗. Next, suppose that x∗  xs. No-
tice that any deviation to x′′′ such that xs  x′′′ ≺ x∗ is profitable, because
c(x∗) > c(x′′′). Therefore, x∗ is not an equilibrium, which leads to a contra-
diction. Hence, xs is unique.
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Proof of Proposition 12. Given a strategy profile x, we can rewrite
firm i’s payoff function piui (x) = ρpi
FRC
i (x) + (1− ρ)piBRCi (x) as follows.
piui (x) =

ρ
(
1
n(i,x) − c(xi)
)
+ (1− ρ)[q (1− c(xi))− (1− q) (c(xi))] if (xi  xs) and
(xi  xj∀j ∈ N)
ρ(−c(xi)) + (1− ρ)[q (1− c(xi))− (1− q) (c(xi))] if (xi  xs) and
(xj  xi for some j ∈ N)
1
n(i,x) − c(xi) if (xi, xj /∈ UC(;xs))
and (xi  xj )∀j ∈ N
−c(xi) otherwise
Assume that ρ ≥ ρ¯ = n(c(xmax)− c(xs)). Notice that ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose
not and assume first that ρ¯ ≤ 0. This implies that c(xmax) ≤ c(xs), which
leads to a contradiction. Next, assume that ρ¯ ≥ 1. This implies that 1
n
−
c(xmax) ≤ −c(xs), which leads to a contradiction. Hence, ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1).
We first show existence. Suppose that firms play xmax = (xmaxi )i∈N . Since
xi  xs and xi  xj ∀j ∈ N , then firm i’s expected profits are piui (xmax) =
1
n
− c(xmax).
Suppose by contradiction that xmax is not a Nash equilibrium. If this is
the case, then there must be at least one profitable deviation.
Assume that firm i deviates, by playing some pure strategy x′, where
necessarily xmax  x′. Clearly, if x′ ≺ xs, then the deviation is not profitable,
because, independently of whether the consumer is an FRC or a BRC, firm
i’s profits would be equal to −c(x′). Hence, assume that x′  xs. Since
x′i  xs and xj  x′i for some j ∈ N , then in this case firm i’s profits are
piui (x
′
i, x
max
−i ) = ρ(−c(x′))+(1−ρ)( 1n(1−c(x′i))− n−1n c(x′i)) = 1n−c(x′)− ρn . The
deviation is profitable only if 1
n
−c(x′)− ρ
n
> 1
n
−c(xmax) or, equivalently, when
ρ < n(c(xmax) − c(x′)). Since ρ ≥ ρ¯ = n(c(xmax) − c(xs)) and c(x′) ≥ c(xs),
then the deviation is never profitable and a contradiction takes place. Hence,
xmax is a Nash equilibrium.
Now we prove uniqueness. As in proof of Proposition 10 and 11 any
equilibrium has to be symmetric. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is
another symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x∗ = (x∗i )i∈N different
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from xmax. Assume that firms play x∗. Hence, each firm i’s profit are 1
n
−
c(x∗). Suppose first that xs  x∗. Applying the reasoning of the proof of
Proposition 10 we conclude that x∗ cannot a Nash equilibrium, because each
firm i could profitably deviate by playing x′  x∗. Next, suppose that x∗  xs
and assume that firm i deviates by playing x′′, where xmax  x′′  x∗. Firm
i’s profits are then piui (x
′′
i , x
∗
−i) = ρ(1−c(x′′))+(1−ρ)( 1n(1−c(x′′i ))− n−1n c(x′′i ))
= ρ+ 1
n
− c(x′′)− ρ
n
. The deviation is profitable only if ρ+ 1
n
− c(x′′)− ρ
n
>
1
n
− c(x∗) or, equivalently, when ρ > n
n−1(c(x
′′) − c(x∗)). Since ρ ≥ ρ¯ =
n(c(xmax) − c(xs)), c(xmax) ≥ c(x′′′) > c(x∗) ≥ c(xs), then the deviation is
profitable and a contradiction takes place. Hence, xmax is unique.
Assume now that ρ < ρ¯ = n
n−1 (c(x
max)− c(xs)). It is clear that in this
case xmax is not a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we show that there are no symmetric Nash equilibria x∗ =
(x∗i )i∈N , where x
s  x∗. Suppose that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that xs  x∗. In this case, each firm i’s profits
are 1
n
− c(x∗). Assume that firm i deviates by playing xs. Firm i’s profits
are then piui (x
s
i , x
∗
−i) = 1− c(xs). Since 1− c(xs) > 1n − c(x∗) is always true,
then the deviation is profitable and a contradiction takes place. Hence, x∗ is
not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose first that the firm plays xmax. If
this is the case, the only candidate to be an equilibrium is strategy profile
(E|FRC,E|BRC, xmax), because the strategy of not entering is dominated
for both types. Let us check whether this is a PBE. Let p(FRC) = 1 −
p(BRC) be the prior probability that the consumer is FRC. In pooling PBE
the firm does not update its beliefs. So, let p(FRC) = p(FRC|E) = p.
The firm supplies xmax if and only if
p(1− c(xmax)) + (1− p)(1− c(xmax)) > p(−c(xs)) + (1− p)(1− c(xs))
1− c(xmax) > −pc(xs) + 1− p− c(xs) + pc(xs)
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p > c(xmax)− c(xs)
Since 1 > c(xmax) > c(xs) > 0, then this implies that the choice of xmax
over xs is feasible. Next, the consumer has not incentives to deviate because,
independently of which type she is, entering is better than not entering.
Indeed, u(xmax) > u¯ and v(xmax) > v¯. Finally, the posterior probability
p(FRC|NE) ∈ [0, 1], because the strategy NE is always strictly dominated.
Next, assume that the firm plays xs. In this case the only candidate to
be an equilibrium is the strategy profile (NE|FRC,E|BRC, xs). The reason
is that if the firm plays xs, the FRC prefers to stay out and the BRC prefers
to enter. Using the Bayes’ rule we get
p(FRC|E) = p(FRC)p(E|FRC)
p(FRC)p(E|FRC) + p(BRC)p(E|BRC)
=
p(FRC)(0)
p(FRC)(0) + p(BRC)(1)
= 0
and
p(FRC|NE) = p(FRC)p(NE|FRC)
p(FRC)p(NE|FRC) + p(BRC)p(NE|BRC)
=
p(FRC)(1)
p(FRC)(1) + p(BRC)(0)
= 1
Let q = p(FRC|E). The firm supplies xs if and only if
q(1− c(xmax)) + (1− q)(1− c(xmax)) < q(−c(xs)) + (1− q)(1− c(xs))
1− c(xmax) < 1− c(xs)
c(xs) < c(xmax)
Since this inequality is always true, then, given these posterior beliefs, xs
is always preferred to xmax. Next, the FRC and the BRC have no incentives
to deviates, because u¯ > u(xs) and v¯ < v(xs), respectively.
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Proof of Proposition 14. Problem 1 can be rewritten as follows.
maxpx,qx px − αqx
s.t. (i) px − ln(qx + 1) ≤ −u−1(u¯)
We first compute the Lagrangian.
L(px, qx, λ) = px − αqx − λ(px − ln(qx + 1) + u−1(u¯))
Now, let us write down the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
∂L
∂px
= 1− λ = 0 (A.1)
∂L
∂qx
= −α + λ
qx + 1
≤ 0 qx
(
∂L
∂qx
)
= 0 (A.2)
∂L
∂λ
= ln(qx + 1)− px − u−1(u¯) ≥ 0 λ
(
∂L
∂λ
)
= 0 (A.3)
together with px > 0 and qx, λ ≥ 0.
By condition 1, λ∗ = 1. Therefore, constraint (i) binds (holds with
equality). Next, suppose, by contradiction, that qx = 0. This implies that
px = −u−1(u¯) < 0, which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, qx > 0 and
condition 2 must bind. Plugging λ∗ = 1 into condition 2 and solving for qx,
we get q∗x =
1
α
− 1. Next, plugging q∗x into condition 3 and solving for px, we
get p∗x = ln(
1
α
)− u−1(u¯). Let this solution be denoted by xc.
Proof of Proposition 15. Problem 2 is the following.
maxpy ,qy py − αqy
s.t. (i) py − p¯ ≤ 0
(ii) q¯ − qy ≤ q
This problem can easily be solved graphically (see figure A.1).
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Figure A.1: Problem 2
Fixing pi = p¯i, let py = αqy + p¯i be the straight line that represents an
isoprofit. Since the level of profits equals the intercept on the y-axes, then
the higher profits the greater intercept. Next, since α ∈ (0, 1), then the
gradient vector points to North-West. Finally, since py ≤ p¯ and qy ≥ q¯, then
the optimal solution is q∗y = q¯ and p
∗
y = p¯. Let this solution be denoted by
yc.
Proof of Proposition 16. Problem 3 can be rewritten as follows.
maxpx,py ,qx,qy ρ (px − αqx) + (1− ρ) (py − αqy)
s.t. (i) px − ln(q1 + 1) ≤ −u−1(u¯)
(ii) py − p¯ ≤ 0
(iii) q¯ − qy ≤ 0
(iv) px − ln(qx + 1)− py + ln(qy + 1) ≤ 0
(v) p¯− px ≤ 0
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We first compute the Lagrangian.
L(px, py, qx, qy, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6) = ρ (px − αqx) + (1 − ρ) (py − αqy) −
λ1(px − ln(qx + 1) + u−1(u¯))− λ2(py − p¯)− λ3(q¯ − qy)− λ4(px − ln(qx + 1)−
py + ln(qy + 1))− λ5(q¯ − px)
Now, let us write down the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
∂L
∂px
= ρ− λ1 − λ4 + λ5 = 0 (A.4)
∂L
∂py
= (1− ρ)− λ2 + λ4 = 0 (A.5)
∂L
∂qx
= −ρα + λ1
qx + 1
+
λ4
qx + 1
≤ 0 (A.6)
∂L
∂qy
= −(1− ρ)α + λ3 − λ4
qy + 1
≤ 0 (A.7)
∂L
∂λ1
= ln(qx + 1)− px − u−1(u¯) ≥ 0 (A.8)
∂L
∂λ2
= p¯− py ≥ 0 (A.9)
∂L
∂λ3
= qy − q¯ ≥ 0 (A.10)
∂L
∂λ4
= ln(qx + 1)− px − ln(qy + 1) + py ≥ 0 (A.11)
∂L
∂λ5
= px − p¯ ≥ 0 (A.12)
together with px, py > 0, qx, qy, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5 ≥ 0, qx
(
∂L
∂qx
)
= 0,
qy
(
∂L
∂qy
)
= 0, λ1
(
∂L
∂λ1
)
= 0, λ2
(
∂L
∂λ2
)
= 0, λ3
(
∂L
∂λ4
)
= 0, and λ5
(
∂L
∂λ5
)
= 0.
Notice that since q¯ > 0, then, by condition 10, condition 7 binds. There-
fore, it must be that λ3 > 0. This implies that q
∗
y = q¯. Next, condition 5
implies that λ2 > 0. Hence, py = p¯. Further, assume by contradiction that
qx = 0. Then, by condition 8, px ≤ −u−1(u¯). Since u−1(u¯) > 0, then px < 0,
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, qx > 0 and condition 6 binds.
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Finally, notice that it cannot be that λ1 = λ4 = 0, because otherwise, by
condition 4, λ5 = −ρ, which leads to a contradiction.
• Assume first that λ5 = 0. This implies that px > p¯.
– Suppose that λ1, λ4 > 0. Hence, constraints (i) and (iv) bind.
Moreover, by condition 4, λ1 + λ4 = 1. Using this result in con-
dition 6 and solving for qx, we get q
∗
x =
1
α
− 1. Next, plugging q∗x
into condition 8 and solving for px, we get p
∗
x = ln
(
1
α
) − u−1(u¯).
By condition 11, it must be that
ln
(
1
α
)
− ln
(
1
α
)
+ u−1(u¯) = ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u−1(u¯) = ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u¯ = u(p¯, q¯)
Moreover, since px > p¯ and p¯ = ln(q¯ + 1)− u−1(u¯), then
px > p¯
ln
(
1
α
)
− u−1(u¯) > ln(q¯ + 1)− u−1(u¯)
1
α
− 1 > q¯
– Assume λ1 > 0 and λ4 = 0. This implies that constraint (i)
binds and constraint (iv) holds with strict inequality. Moreover,
by condition 4, λ1 = ρ. Using this result in condition 6 and solving
for qx, we get q
∗
x =
1
α
− 1. Next, plugging q∗x into condition 8 and
solving for px, we get p
∗
x = ln
(
1
α
) − u−1(u¯). By condition 11, it
must be that
ln
(
1
α
)
− ln
(
1
α
)
+ u−1(u¯) > ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u−1(u¯) > ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u¯ > u(p¯, q¯)
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Moreover, since px > p¯ and p¯ > ln(q¯ + 1)− u−1(u¯), then
px > p¯
ln
(
1
α
)
− u−1(u¯) > ln(q¯ + 1)− u−1(u¯)
1
α
− 1 > q¯
– Assume that λ1 = 0 and λ4 > 0. This implies that constraint (i)
holds with strict inequality and constraint (iv) binds. Moreover,
by condition 4, λ4 = ρ. Using this result in condition 6 and solving
for qx, we get q
∗
x =
1
α
− 1. Next, plugging q∗x into condition 11 and
solving for px, we get p
∗
x = ln
(
1
α
)− ln(q¯ + 1) + p¯. By condition 8,
it must be that
ln
(
1
α
)
− ln
(
1
α
)
+ ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯− u−1(u¯) > 0
u−1(u¯) < ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u¯ < u(p¯, q¯)
Moreover, since px > p¯, then
px > p¯
ln
(
1
α
)
− ln(q¯ + 1) + p¯ > p¯
1
α
− 1 > q¯
• Suppose that λ5 > 0. This implies that p∗x = p¯.
– Suppose that λ1, λ4 > 0. This implies that constraints (i) and
(iv) bind. Plugging p∗x into condition 8 and solving for qx, we get
q∗x = e
p¯+u−1u¯ − 1. Next, by condition 11
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p¯+ u−1(u¯)− p¯ = ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u−1(u¯) = ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u¯ = u(p¯, q¯)
– Suppose that λ1 > 0 and λ4 = 0. This implies that constraint (i)
binds and constraint (iv) holds with strict inequality. Plugging p∗x
into condition 8 and solving for qx, we get q
∗
x = e
p¯+u−1u¯− 1. Next,
by condition 11
p¯+ u−1(u¯)− p¯ > ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u−1(u¯) > ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u¯ > u(p¯, q¯)
– Suppose that λ1 = 0 and λ4 > 0. This implies that constraint (i)
holds with strict inequality and constraint (iv) binds. Plugging
p∗x into condition 11 and solving for qx, we get q
∗
x = q¯. Next, by
condition 8
ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯− u−1(u¯) > 0
u−1(u¯) < ln(q¯ + 1)− p¯
u¯ < u(p¯, q¯)
This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to check necessity.
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Sufficiency. Assume that c satisfies FAWARP.
STEP 1: There exists a strict linear order  on X, where x  y whenever
x = c(A, {Aj}), where A = A1 = {x, y}.
Proof. Let x  y whenever x = c(A, {Aj}), where A = A1 = {x, y}.
Notice that y attracts attention at (A, {Aj}). It is immediate to see that 
is asymmetric, irreflexive, and complete. Next, we show that  is transitive.
Assume that x  y and y  z. Consider a (C, {Cj}) ∈ D1 such that C =
C1 = {x, y, z}. Since C1 = C, then necessarily x, y, and z attract attention
at (C, {Cj}). Notice that if z = c(C, {Cj}), then, by FAWARP, z  y,
which leads to a contradiction. Similarly, it cannot be that y = c(C, {Cj}).
Therefore, x = c(C, {Cj}). Then, by FAWARP, x  z. Hence,  is transitive.
Therefore, we conclude that  is a strict linear order.2
STEP 2: Let (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 and assume that Γ(A,{Aj}) ⊆ A is the set
of alternatives that attract attention at (A, {Aj}). Then, {c(A, {Aj})} =
max(Γ(A,{Aj});).
Proof. Let (A, {Aj}) ∈ D and assume that Γ(A,{Aj}) ⊆ A is the set of
alternatives that attract attention at (A, {Aj}). Let x = c(A, {Aj}). Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that y  x for some y ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}) \ {x}. In this case,
y = c(B, {Bj}), where B = B1 = {x, y}. Since x and y attract attention
at (B, {Bj}), then, by FAWARP, x 6= c(A, {Aj}), which leads to a contra-
diction. Therefore, there are no y ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}) \ {x} such that y  x. This
implies that {c(A, {Aj})} = max(Γ(A,{Aj});), which is the desired result.2
STEP 3: There exists a partition (S,X \S) of the grand set X such that
c(A, {Aj}) ∈ S for any (A, {Aj}) with A ∩ S 6= ∅.
Proof. Define S = {x ∈ X|@(B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that x ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 }.
Consider any (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 such that x ∈ A∪S 6= ∅. Suppose, by contradic-
tion, that y = c(A, {Aj}) /∈ S. Since y /∈ S, then all alternatives in A attract
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attention at (A, {Aj}). By STEP 2, y  x. Next, since y /∈ S, then there
exists a (B, {Bj}) ∈ D1 such that y ∈ Bc(B,{Bj})m−1 . Let z = c(B, {Bj}). Notice
that y attracts attention at (B, {Bj}) and, therefore, by STEP 2, z  y.
Let (C, {Cj}) ∈ D1 such that C = {x, y, z} and C1 = {x, y}. Notice that
(C, {Cj}) exists. Suppose not. Assume first that z ∈ A. Since all alternatives
in A attract attention at (A, {Aj}), then, by STEP 2, y  z, a contradiction.
Hence, (C, {Cj}) 6= (A, {Aj}). Next, suppose that (B, {Bj}) = (C, {Cj}).
This would imply that x /∈ S, a contradiction. Therefore, (C, {Cj}) exists.
We want to show that any choice from (C, {Cj}) leads to a contradiction.
Assume first that x = c(C, {Cj}). In this case, by STEP 2, x  y, which
leads to a contradiction. Next, assume y = c(C, {Cj}). This implies that
all alternatives in C attract attention at (C, {Cj}) and, therefore, by STEP
2, y  z, which leads to a contradiction. Assume then that z = c(C, {Cj}).
However this contradicts the fact that x ∈ S. Since {c()} cannot be empty,
then c(A, {Aj}) ∈ S, which is the desired result.2
STEP 4: For any (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1,
Γ(A,{Aj}) =
{
Amin{j|Aj∩S 6=∅} if A ∩ S 6= ∅
A otherwise
Proof. By STEP 2, {c(A, {Aj})} = max(Γ(A,{Aj});), where Γ(A,{Aj})
is the set of alternatives that attract attention at (A, {Aj}). Suppose first
that A ∩ S 6= ∅. We have to show that Γ(A,{Aj}) = A1. Assume first that
x ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}). Since A∩S 6= ∅, then, by STEP 3, it must be that c(A, {Aj}) ∈
S. If this is the case, then x ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}) implies that x ∈ Ac(A,{Aj})m and
A
c(A,{Aj})
m = Amin{j|Aj∩S 6=∅}. Hence, x ∈ Amin{j|Aj∩S 6=∅}. Conversely, assume
that x ∈ Amin{j|Aj∩S 6=∅}. This immediately implies that x ∈ Γ(A,{Aj}).
On the other hand, if A∩S = ∅, it is immediate to see that Γ(A,{Aj}) = A.2
Therefore, we conclude that c is an SCF.
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Proof of Theorem 2. It is easy to check necessity.
Sufficiency. Assume that c satisfies FAWARP2. STEP 1, STEP 2, and
STEP 3 are analogous to those of Theorem 1. For this reason we omit the
proof.
STEP 1: There exists a strict linear order  on X, where x  y whenever
x = c(A,A1), where A = A1 = {x, y}.
STEP 2: Let (A,A1) ∈ D2 and assume that Γ(A,A1) ⊆ A is the set of alter-
natives that attract attention at (A,A1). Then, {c(A,A1)} = max(Γ(A,A1);
).
STEP 3: There exists a partition (S,X \S) of the grand set X such that
c(A,A1) ∈ S for any (A,A1) with A ∩ S 6= ∅, where S = {x ∈ X|@(A,A1) ∈
D2 such that x ∈ A1 and c(A,A1) /∈ A1}.
STEP 4: For any (A,A1) ∈ D2,
Γ(A,{Aj}) =

A1 if A1 ∩ S 6= ∅
A¯ if (A \ A1) ∩ S 6= ∅ = A1 ∩ S
A otherwise
where A¯ = A1 ∪ {x ∈ A \ A1|c(A,A1)  x} ∪ {c(A,A1)}.
Proof. By STEP 2, {c(A,A1)} = max(Γ(A,A1);), where Γ(A,A1) is the set
of alternatives that attract attention at (A,A1). Suppose first thatA1∩S 6= ∅.
We have to show that Γ(A,A1) = A1. Assume first that x ∈ Γ(A,A1). Since
A1 ∩ S 6= ∅, then, by STEP 3, it must be that c(A,A1) ∈ S. This implies
that case 2 and case 3 of Definition 7 cannot occur. Hence, only case 1 of
Definition 7 can occur, that is, x ∈ A1, as desired. Conversely, assume that
x ∈ A1. This immediately implies that x ∈ Γ(A,A1).
Assume that (A\A1)∩S 6= ∅ = A1∩S. We have to show that Γ(A,A1) = A¯,
where A¯ = A1 ∪ {x ∈ A \ A1|c(A,A1)  x} ∪ {c(A,A1)}. Assume first that
x ∈ Γ(A,A1). Since (A\A1)∩S 6= ∅ = A1∩S, then, by STEP 2, c(A,A1) ∈ S,
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which rules out case 2 of Definition 7. This implies that x ∈ A1 (case 1)
and x ∈ A \ A1 only if c(A,A1)  x (case 3) or x = c(A,A1). Hence,
x ∈ A¯. Conversely, assume that x ∈ A¯. Since, by STEP 3, it must be that
c(A,A1) ∈ S, then c(A,A1) /∈ A1, which rules out only case 2 of Definition
7. Hence, x ∈ Γ(A,A1), as desired.
Finally, assume that A ∩ S = ∅. We have to show that Γ(A,A1) = A.
Clearly, x ∈ Γ(A,A1) implies x ∈ A. Conversely, assume that x ∈ A. Since
A ∩ S = ∅, then there is some (B,B1) ∈ D2 such that c(A,A1) ∈ B1 and
c(B,B1) /∈ B1. This implies that x ∈ Γ(A,A1) as desired.2
Therefore, we conclude that c is an SCF2.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first prove that if the extended choice function
c is an SCF, then the restriction of c to DL is a DR,δ.
Assume that c is an SCF. Define the relation R in the following way:
max(X;R) ≡ UC(X;xs) and R ranks the unsatisfactory alternatives as 
does. It is easy to see that c(A, {Aj}) = DR,δ for any (A, {Aj}) ∈ DL and
δ(xs) = 1.
Next, we show that a DR,δ can be extended to an SCF if and only if δ = 1
and the sets in I(R;\max) are singletons.
We first prove that if a DR,δ can be extended to an SCF, then δ = 1 and
the sets in I(R;\max) are singletons. Assume that DR,δ can be extended to an
SCF. This means that c is a SCF and c(A, {Aj}) = DR,δ for all (A, {Aj}) ∈
DL. Suppose, by contradiction, that δ = 1 and the sets in I(R;\max) are
singletons. Then there are three cases.
Case (i): δ = 2 and the sets in I(R;\max) are singletons. If this is the case,
then c(A, {Aj}) ∈ UC(X;xs), but there exists some (A, {Aj}) ∈ DL such
that A
c(A,{Aj})
i−1 ∩ UC(X;xs) 6= ∅. However, this contradicts the fact that
whenever UC(X;xs) ∩ A 6= ∅, then Γ(A,{Aj}) = Aj, where j = min{j|Aj ∩
UC(A;xs) 6= ∅}, which leads to a contradiction. Hence, δ = 1.
Case (ii): δ = 1 and there is a non-singleton set in I(R;\max). Assume that
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y, z ∈ X belong to that set. Therefore, y, z /∈ UC(X;xs). Assume WLOG
that y  z. Let (A, {Aj}), (A, {A′j}) ∈ DL, where A1 = {z}, A2 = {y, z},
A′1 = {y}, and A′2 = {y, z}. Since δ = 1, then yI1z, that is, z = c(A, {Aj)
and y = c(A, {A′j}). However, this contradicts FAWARP and, therefore, c is
not an SCF, which leads to a contradiction. Hence, the sets in I(R;\max) are
singletons.
Case (iii): δ = 2 and there is a non-singleton set in I(R;\max). A con-
tradiction takes place from what is proved in cases (i) and (ii), which is the
desired result.
Conversely, assume that the restriction of c to DL is a DR,δ, where δ = 1
and the sets in I(R;\max) are singletons. We want to show that c can be
extended to an SCF. We first show that the restriction of c to DL is an
SCF. Define UC(X;xs) ≡ max(X;R). Moreover, define  in the following
way: x  y for all x ∈ max(X;R) and y /∈ max(X;R) and  ranks all
alternatives y /∈ max(X;R) as R does. Since δ = 1, then c always picks
from (A, {Aj}) ∈ DL the first x ∈ UC(X;xs) that appears in the menu
sequence. Next, the fact that all sets in I(R;\max) are singletons rules out the
possibility that FAWARP is violated in the way it is explained in case (ii).
Therefore, the restriction of c to DL is an SCF. Next, complete the relation
 by imposing the satisfactory alternatives to be ranked according to any
order. Moreover, for the remaining problems (A, {Aj}) ∈ D1 \ DL impose c
to satisfy FAWARP. Hence, c is an SCF.
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